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Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the 
Basis of Criminal Convictions 
Anna Roberts† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In the early 1960s, a teenager named Frank Johnson ap-
peared in a municipal court in Texas, where he was found 
guilty of theft of less than five dollars.1 He was thirteen or four-
teen, and his punishment was a fifty dollar fine.2
Twenty years later, Mr. Johnson received a summons for 
jury duty.
 
3 The prosecution asserted that his twenty-year-old 
conviction disqualified him, and over the objection of the de-
fense the court excused him.4 The court did not consider the 
passage of time, or the smallness of the sum, or anything about 
Mr. Johnson as an adult.5 Under the Texas disqualification 
statute—then, as now—a conviction of misdemeanor theft pre-
cludes jury service for life.6
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ry, for their research assistance, and to Inga Nelson, Josh Porte, and the 
members of the Minnesota Law Review for their editorial work. Copyright © 
2013 by Anna Roberts. 
 
 1. See Frame v. State, 615 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). 
 2. Id.  
 3. See id. at 769. 
 4. Id. at 768. 
 5. See id. at 768–69. 
 6. See TEX. CODE ANN. § 62.102 (2013) (“A person is disqualified to serve 
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This Article addresses the exclusion from criminal jury 
service of those who have a criminal record.7 Statutory exclu-
sions are in place in the federal system and in forty-eight 
states8: while the majority of them address felony convictions, 
thirteen—as in the case of Texas—provide for the disqualifica-
tion of at least some people with misdemeanor convictions.9 Ex-
tending beyond statutory disqualifications are several other 
means by which a conviction can be used to preclude jury ser-
vice in the absence of any showing of bias: the selective mailing 
of jury summonses,10 the exercise of peremptory challenges,11 
and the granting of challenges for cause.12 The combination of 
the breadth of these exclusions and the thinness of their justifi-
cations offers a prime example of, as James Forman puts it, 
“how casually, almost carelessly, our society ostracizes offend-
ers.”13
This Article rejects casual and careless ostracism in favor 
of a careful analysis of the costs and benefits of this type of civic 
exclusion. This analysis incorporates three broader policy cri-
tiques that are currently being leveled at the criminal justice 




as a petit juror unless the person . . . (7) has not been convicted of misdemean-
or theft or a felony . . . .”). 
 It 
shows how they can inform, and be informed by, critiques of 
this type of jury exclusion. 
 7. Exclusions of those with criminal convictions from civil jury service 
are also prevalent, but beyond the scope of this Article. See Brian C. Kalt, The 
Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65 app. 1 at 168–69 
(2003). 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
 9. See infra notes 39–42.  
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
 11. See infra Part I.D. 
 12. See infra Part I.C. The reach of jury exclusions relating to the criminal 
justice system extends beyond the scope of this article, to include those who 
have merely been arrested or charged, Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking Ju-
rors: Disparate Impact and the (Mis)use of Batson, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1359, 1375, 1408 (2012) [hereinafter Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors], and 
those whose family members have had experience with the criminal justice 
system, see id. at 1375, 1403–04. Exclusions from grand jury service are also 
beyond the scope of this article. See Kalt, supra note 7, at 168–69. 
 13. James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the 
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 27 (2012). My thanks to Professor For-
man for allowing me to adapt his phrase. 
 14. This Article leaves to one side constitutional arguments analyzing 
statutory exclusions in relation to the guarantee of an “impartial jury” and a 
“fair cross-section”; they are compelling, but have been handled (at least as 
regards felony convictions) elsewhere. See, e.g., Kalt, supra note 7, at 70–100. 
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First, the sizeable and growing body of research into the 
characteristics of wrongful conviction cases indicates that ju-
rors have, in many cases, failed to understand central aspects 
of the criminal justice system.15 This lack of understanding un-
dermines the unquestioning exclusion of those with firsthand 
experience of the system. Second, recent scholarship has identi-
fied the adjustment of prosecutorial incentives as a key compo-
nent of criminal justice reform.16 This Article adds jury exclu-
sion to that literature, critiquing and proposing adjustments to 
a system in which the state can remove from the jury, without 
cost to itself, those who are presumed to be embittered against 
the state. Third, Alexandra Natapoff has highlighted the “si-
lencing of criminal defendants” at various points in the crimi-
nal process as an obstacle to reform.17
Part I compiles the various means by which criminal con-
victions are used as a basis for jury exclusion. Part II examines 
the impact of these exclusions, focusing on three of the main 
harms. Part III investigates whether the justifications that are 
given for these exclusions outweigh the harms. Part IV recom-
mends the abandonment of automatic exclusions on the basis of 
criminal convictions: they lack sufficient justification, and per-
mit the state to remove, without cost to itself, those assumed to 
be embittered against the state.  
 This Article extends her 
critique to the process of jury selection.  
I.  THE EXCLUSIONS   
This Part lays out the multiple methods by which potential 
jurors are excluded on the basis of criminal convictions: selec-
tive mailing of jury summonses, statutory disqualifications, 
challenges for cause, and peremptory challenges. It demon-
 
 15. See Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute 
to Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 113 (2006) [herein-
after Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable] (“[I]nformants may have an air of ‘inside 
knowledge’ about the crime that may sway the jury, an air that is not easily 
dispelled by cautionary instructions. Indeed, the prevalence of wrongful con-
victions based on snitch testimony demonstrates that juries often believe in-
formants.” (footnote omitted)); The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (including as main 
contributing causes of wrongful convictions in DNA exonerations “[f]alse 
[c]onfessions/[a]dmissions,” “[i]nformants or [s]nitches,” and “[g]overnment 
[m]isconduct”) (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
 16. See infra notes 275–82. 
 17. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defend-
ants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (2005) [hereinafter Natapoff, Speechless]. 
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strates both their cumulative effect and the wide variety of ap-
proaches that different jurisdictions take. 
A. JURY SUMMONSES 
Lists of potential jurors are compiled largely (and in the 
federal system often exclusively) from voter registration rolls.18 
In forty-eight states, those with felony convictions face some re-
striction of their voting rights.19 Where these restrictions result 
in erasure from the voting rolls, those with felony convictions 
will not receive a jury summons.20
B. STATUTORY DISQUALIFICATIONS 
 
Colorado and Maine are the only two states without any 
statutory provisions permitting the exclusion of potential jurors 
on the basis of criminal convictions.21 Iowa is the only state 
whose statutory regime merely provides for dismissals for 
cause on this basis22
 
 18. Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal 
Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 970 (1998) (“Federal courts now 
use voter lists as the primary (often exclusive) source for juror names, despite 
significant evidence that this method results in the underrepresentation of 
some groups.”); Alexander E. Preller, Note, Jury Duty Is a Poll Tax: The Case 
for Severing the Link Between Voter Registration and Jury Service, 46 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 (2012) (“[F]orty-two out of fifty states use voter regis-
tration lists to form jury lists . . . .”). 
: as will be discussed in Part C, this is not 
 19. See Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, NYU, http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48642.pdf (May, 2007) (indicating that on-
ly two states, Maine and Vermont, have no restrictions on the basis of criminal 
convictions). A word about nomenclature. I will follow Margaret Colgate Love 
in avoiding the word “felon.” Margaret Colgate Love, What’s in a Name? A Lot, 
When the Name Is “Felon”, THE CRIME REPORT (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www 
.thecrimereport.org/viewpoints/2012-03-whats-in-a-name-a-lot-when-the-name 
-is-felon (describing the term “felon” as an “ugly” and “unhelpful label”).  
 20. See United States v. Manbeck, 514 F. Supp. 141, 146 (D.S.C. 1981). 
 21. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-105 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 1211 
(2013); see Kalt, supra note 7, at app. 1A (giving a survey of all fifty states’ and 
federal policies on juror disqualification on the basis of felony convictions). 
Both states deleted such provisions in the 1980s. See Act of Apr. 28–29, 1982, 
ch. 705, pt. G, sec. 4, § 1211, 1981 Me. Laws 1263 (deleting language disquali-
fying those who have lost the vote because of a criminal conviction); People v. 
Ellis, 148 P.3d 205, 209 (Colo. App. 2006) (“Prior to the repeal and reenact-
ment of the Colorado Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act in 1989, a con-
victed felon was not allowed to serve on a jury, unless his or her right to vote 
had been restored. The current and applicable version of the act no longer dis-
qualifies convicted felons whose voting rights have not been restored from 
serving on a jury.”). 
 22. IOWA R. CRIM. P. § 2.18(5)(a) (2013); see Kalt, supra note 7, at app. 1A. 
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an automatic exclusion, but permits the judge some discretion. 
The remaining jurisdictions permit certain criminal records to 
act as a disqualification: jurors who are disqualified are auto-
matically deemed unfit, and are not even supposed to reach the 
jury box. 
In forty-seven states and the federal system, disqualifica-
tion from jury service of those with a felony record is provided 
for by statute.23 While in some jurisdictions, this exclusion ap-
plies to all felonies and lasts forever,24 many qualify the dis-
qualification in some way. The disqualification may end at the 
same time as one’s imprisonment,25 or sentence,26 or if one is 
able to obtain an amnesty,27 annulment,28 expunction,29 par-
don,30 reversal,31 or restoration of civil rights.32 The disqualifica-
tion may be triggered only by a particular type of felony,33 by 
incarceration,34 or only by incarceration for a certain period of 
time.35 The disqualification may last for only a certain period of 
years after conviction,36 or after completion of one’s sentence.37 
Each jurisdiction makes the cut differently.38
 
 23. See Kalt, supra note 
  
7, at app. 1A. 
 24. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1307a(1)(e) (2013). 
 25. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-35 (2013). 
 26. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-1 (2013). 
 27. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4502(a)(3) (2013). 
 28. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500-A:6 (2013).  
 29. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-105(2) (2013). 
 30. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-4(b)(2) (2013). 
 31. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2961.01(A)(1) (2013). 
 32. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2006). This restoration may happen 
automatically, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2013), or require an affirma-
tive act by the person seeking the restoration, see, e.g., United States v. Bar-
low, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 33. See ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177 (limiting voting rights of those “con-
victed of a felony of moral turpitude”); ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013) (qualify-
ing for jury service only one who “is generally reputed to be honest and intelli-
gent and is esteemed in the community for integrity, good character and sound 
judgment” and who “[h]as not lost the right to vote by conviction for any of-
fense involving moral turpitude”).  
 34. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-217(a)(2) (2013) (disqualifying from 
jury service anyone who is “in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction”). 
 35. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-103(b)(4) (West 2012) (dis-
qualifying individuals who have been convicted of a crime “punishable by im-
prisonment exceeding 6 months and received a sentence of imprisonment for 
more than 6 months”). 
 36. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-217(a)(2) (2013) (seven years); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 43-158(c) (2012) (ten years).  
 37. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 10.030(3)(E) (2013) (fifteen years).  
 38. States are divided, for example, on whether a no contest plea man-
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The disqualifications go beyond felony convictions: statuto-
ry provisions in thirteen states make those with certain mis-
demeanor convictions vulnerable to disqualification.39 Those 
states may limit the disqualification by type of conviction,40 by 
type of sentence,41 or by whether the person is currently in cus-
tody.42
 
dates exclusion. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-95(c) (2012) (no), with KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 43-158(c) (yes). 
 Again, each jurisdiction makes the cut differently. 
 39. W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013); CAL. CIV. 
PROC. § 203(a)(5) (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-217(a)(2) (2013); FLA. 
STAT. § 40.013(1) (2013); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2(3) (2007); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-202 (LexisNexis 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-303(2) (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-1(e) (West 
2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10.030(3)(F) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1-102 
(2013); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.102 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 3-1-3 (2011); W. 
VA. CODE § 52-1-8(b)(5) (2008). In Alabama, a prospective juror must be, 
among other things, “generally reputed to be honest and intelligent” and “es-
teemed in the community for integrity, good character and sound judgment.” 
ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013). On appeal, an Alabama court upheld the invo-
cation of this provision to support the exclusion of a juror who had merely 
been arrested. See Dobyne v. State, 672 So. 2d 1319, 1331 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1994). This willingness to uphold the exclusion of someone merely arrested 
(for an unstated offense) supports the argument that the provision is also 
available to justify the exclusion of someone with a misdemeanor conviction. 
For the fact that Connecticut’s provision, which disqualifies those in the cus-
tody of the Commissioner of Correction, encompasses those who are impris-
oned for a misdemeanor conviction, see section 51-217(a)(2) of the General 
Statutes of Connecticut; E-mail from the Office of Pub. Info., Conn. Dep’t of 
Corr. to Anna Roberts, Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle Univ. Sch. of Law 
(Dec. 28, 2012, 05:38 PST) (on file with author) (confirming that those under 
sentence for a misdemeanor conviction are housed within the Connecticut De-
partment of Correction). 
 40. See CAL. CIV. PROC. § 203(a)(5) (West 2013) (disqualifying those “who 
have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony, and whose civil rights 
have not been restored”); FLA. STAT. § 40.013(1) (2013) (disqualifying those 
convicted of “bribery, forgery, perjury, [or] larceny”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 9-202 (LexisNexis 2013) (disqualifying those convicted of bribing or at-
tempting to bribe a juror); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013) (excluding those 
convicted of “the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors within a period of five 
years” and the “common gambler or habitual drunkard”); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-15-303(2) (2013) (excluding those convicted of “malfeasance in office”); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-1(e) (West 2013) (excluding those convicted of “any indict-
able offense”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10.030(F) (2012) (excluding those con-
victed of a “misdemeanor involving violence or dishonesty”); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 22-1-102 (2013) (excluding those convicted of “perjury or subornation of per-
jury”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.102(7) (2013) (excluding those convicted of 
“misdemeanor theft”); W. VA. CODE § 52-1-8(b)(6) (2008) (excluding those con-
victed of perjury or false swearing). Mississippi also requires jurors to be “ei-
ther a qualified elector, or a resident freeholder of the county for more than 
one year.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013); see infra note 44. 
 41. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-103(b)(4)–(5) (LexisNexis 
2013) (disqualifying those convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment 
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Aside from statutory provisions that explicitly base dis-
qualifications on convictions, several provisions that make no 
mention of disqualification on the basis of criminal record can 
have that effect indirectly. Some states, for example, limit jury 
service to those who are “qualified elector[s],”43 thus allowing 
any conviction-based disqualifications from voting to bring 
about secondary disqualifications from jury service.44 Other 
states make use of vague terms that can encompass criminal 
convictions. Illinois requires that jurors be “[f]ree from all legal 
exception, of fair character, of approved integrity, of sound 
judgment.”45 In Alabama, an individual may qualify for jury 
service only if he or she “is generally reputed to be honest and 
intelligent and is esteemed in the community for integrity, good 
character and sound judgment”;46
 
exceeding 6 months” and who “received a sentence of imprisonment for more 
than 6 months”). 
 even if this standard is met, a 
 42. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-217(a)(2) (2013) (excluding those who are 
“in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction,” a group that includes those 
imprisoned for misdemeanors). For the fact that Connecticut’s provision en-
compasses those who are imprisoned for a misdemeanor conviction, see supra 
note 39. 
 43. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013); see, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 52-1-8(b)(5) 
(2008) (disqualifying anyone who has lost the right to vote because of a crimi-
nal conviction). 
 44. See ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013) (qualifying for jury service only 
one who “[h]as not lost the right to vote by conviction for any offense involving 
moral turpitude”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-33-01 (2013) (stating that those 
“sentenced for a felony to a term of imprisonment, during the term of actual 
incarceration under such sentence” may not vote); id. § 27-09.1-08 (2013) (stat-
ing that a prospective juror is disqualified if he or she “[h]as lost the right to 
vote because of imprisonment in the penitentiary . . . or conviction of a crimi-
nal offense which by special provision of law disqualified the prospective juror 
for such service”). Mississippi requires each juror to be “either a qualified elec-
tor, or a resident freeholder of the county for more than one year,” thus con-
necting jury exclusion to disenfranchisement, which befalls those convicted of 
“murder, rape, bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pre-
tense, perjury, forgery, embezzlement or bigamy.” MISS. CONST. art. XII, 
§ 241; MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013). 
 45. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2 (2007). Illinois courts have interpreted this 
language, variously, as banning all those who have previously been “charged 
with various crimes,” People v. Gil, 608 N.E.2d 197, 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); 
barring all those with criminal records; and referring only to those with “re-
cent or extensive criminal histories.” See Kalt, supra note 7, at 152 n.389. 
 46. ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013). On appeal, an Alabama court upheld, 
as not erroneous, the invocation of this provision to support the exclusion of a 
juror who had merely been arrested. See Dobyne v. State, 672 So. 2d 1319, 
1331 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). This willingness to uphold the exclusion of some-
one merely arrested (for some unstated offense) supports the notion that the 
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juror may be disqualified from jury service if a conviction for a 
“crime involving moral turpitude” prevents him or her from vot-
ing.47
Thus jurisdictions approach this question differently, disa-
greeing on whether there should be automatic statutory dis-
qualifications at all; whether, if they exist, they should include 
some or all misdemeanors; whether they should last forever; 
and what type of conviction or punishment should trigger them. 
As one federal judge has suggested, these types of differences 
“make[] the ban seem somewhat arbitrary.”
  
48
C. CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE 
  
Once a group of potential jurors makes it into the jury box 
for questioning by the attorneys, the next possible means of ex-
clusion is the challenge for cause. Challenges for cause are 
available in unlimited number, provided that the trial judge is 
persuaded that the jurors in question cannot, for example, 
“fairly and adequately fulfill [their] responsibilities.”49
Challenges for cause offer a variety of ways in which a ju-
ror’s criminal record can be a basis for his or her exclusion. 
First, they may be established by statute as a way of enforcing 




provision is also available to justify the exclusion of someone with a conviction. 
See also supra note 
 Second, they 
may be established by statute as a way of extending, or replac-
ing, statutory disqualifications. In Alabama, for example, the 
statutory disqualification applies only to those who have been 
39. 
 47. ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182; see also ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a)(4) 
(2013) (barring from jury service those who have “lost the right to vote by con-
viction for any offense involving moral turpitude”); Chapman v. Gooden, 974 
So. 2d 972, 976–77 (Ala. 2007) (discussing which crimes might be felonies in-
volving moral turpitude). 
 48. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, 
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“That a felon could be . . . in-
competent in a federal court in one state but competent in another, makes the 
ban seem somewhat arbitrary.”). 
 49. See SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, JUROR COMPENSATION AND QUALIFICA-
TION: SENATE FISCAL AGENCY BILL ANALYSIS: S.B. 1448 & 1452 AND H.B. 
4551-4553 ENROLLED ANALYSIS, 91st Leg., 5th Sess., at 5 (Mich. 2003) [here-
inafter JUROR COMPENSATION AND QUALIFICATION], available at http:// 
legislature.mi.gov/documents/2001-2002/billanalysis/Senate/pdf/2001-SFA 
-1448-E.pdf (implying that challenges for cause are unlimited but peremptory 
challenges, by contrast, are limited). 
 50. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 2.511(D) (“It is grounds for a challenge for cause 
that the person: (1) is not qualified to be a juror . . . .”). 
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convicted of a crime “involving moral turpitude.”51 Any felony 
conviction is a good ground for a challenge for cause, however, 
whether turpitudinous or not.52 As mentioned above,53 Iowa has 
no statutory disqualifications but permits the removal for cause 
of those with a felony conviction.54 Third, they may be granted 
on the basis of a criminal conviction even where there is no 
statutory provision establishing this as a basis for a challenge 
for cause.55
A challenge for cause based on a criminal conviction may 
or may not rely on the judge’s discretion. If a juror “admits par-
tiality” stemming from a criminal conviction, the judge has 
broad discretion to grant the challenge;
  
56 in other instances 
statute may require the granting of the challenge (even in the 
absence of any demonstrated bias),57 or the granting may be in 
the judge’s discretion.58
 
 51. ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a) (2013). 
 North Dakota, on the other hand, has 
explicitly rejected the idea that a felony conviction in and of it-
self is grounds for a challenge for cause. Having repealed an 
earlier legislative provision that made those with felony convic-
tions permanently vulnerable to a cause challenge, the state 
 52. ALA. CODE § 12-16-150(5) (2013). Similarly, in Oklahoma the statuto-
ry disqualification applies only to those who (a) have been convicted of a felony 
and (b) have not had their civil rights restored. OKLA. STAT. tit. 38, § 28(C)(5) 
(2013). By contrast, a judge may grant a cause challenge solely on the basis of 
a felony conviction. Id. at tit. 22, § 658 (2013). 
 53. See supra note 2223 and accompanying text. 
 54. See IOWA CT. R. 1.915(6)(a), 2.18(5)(a). 
 55. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE FIN. COMM., FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, H.R. 47-
531, 2d Sess., at 2 (N.M. 2006), available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/ 
06%20Regular/firs/HB0531.pdf (noting, in the context of jurors with felony 
convictions, that “[j]urors may be excluded for cause if the judge agrees the 
juror cannot serve impartially”). 
 56. United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997); see id. at 43–
45. 
 57. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a) (West 2013) (giv-
ing, as second ground for a cause challenge, that “the juror has been convicted 
of misdemeanor theft or a felony”); id. (“No juror shall be impaneled when it 
appears that the juror is subject to the second, third or fourth grounds of chal-
lenge for cause set forth above, although both parties may consent.”). 
 58. In Iowa, for example, where the only statutory conviction-based exclu-
sion is for cause, the court of appeals has held the statutory language to imply 
“permissive or discretionary action.” State v. Shimko, 725 N.W.2d 659, No. 05-
17158, 2006 WL 3018467, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2006); see supra notes 
53–54 and accompanying text; see also Shimko, 725 N.W.2d, 2006 WL 
3018467, at *2 (“The test to be applied in ruling on challenges for cause is 
‘whether the juror holds such a fixed opinion on the merits of the case that he 
or she cannot judge impartially the guilt or innocence of the defendant.’” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
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now requires that there be “[other] grounds” to justify the re-
moval of someone with a felony conviction.59
Thus, again, jurisdictions differ on the question of whether 
a judge should automatically grant a cause challenge where a 
potential juror has a criminal conviction, or whether a convic-
tion is insufficient to demonstrate that the juror is unfit. 
 
D. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
The final way in which a criminal record can prompt a re-
moval from the jury is through a peremptory challenge exer-
cised by one of the attorneys. Peremptory challenges differ from 
challenges for cause in two ways: first, they are finite in num-
ber,60 and second, ordinarily no reason need be given for them.61 
It is only if a Batson claim is made—if, in other words, the op-
posing party makes an allegation that the peremptory chal-
lenge was used to effect purposeful discrimination on the basis 
of race, ethnicity or gender—that a justification need be given.62 
That justification needs to be “race- [or ethnicity-, or gender-] 
neutral”63 but does not need to be persuasive, or even plausi-
ble.64
When met with a Batson claim on the grounds of racial or 
ethnic discrimination, prosecutors frequently offer as a justifi-
cation the fact that a potential juror has a criminal record, or 




 59. City of Mandan v. Baer, 578 N.W.2d 559, 563 (N.D. 1998) (indicating 
that in 1993 North Dakota “eliminate[d] ‘conviction for a felony’ as a specifical-
ly enumerated challenge for cause”); id. (“A convicted felon may be excused 
from the venire, but the removal must be based on grounds other than convic-
tion of a felony.”). 
 Indeed, as Melynda Price 
found in her survey of capital cases drawn from the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeal, a “link to the criminal justice system 
ranks second only to ambivalent views on the death penalty as 
 60. See Andrew Weis, Peremptory Challenges: The Last Barrier to Jury 
Service for People with Disabilities, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 41 (1997); supra 
note 49 and accompanying text. 
 61. See Weis, supra note 60, at 5; supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 62. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986); see Weis, supra note 60, at 
10–11. 
 63. Id. at 11; see id. at 10. 
 64. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995) (per curiam). 
 65. See Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 12, at 45. 
  
602 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:592 
 
the most frequently cited reason for using peremptory chal-
lenges to remove African American jurors.”66
Thus, in each of these four major ways, criminal convic-
tions can lead to removal from jury service. The variation be-
tween states is striking, as is the cumulative picture of im-
mense vulnerability to this form of civic exclusion.  
  
II.  THE HARMS   
This Part addresses three of the primary harms created by 
the regimes of exclusion laid out in Part I: racial disparity and 
cover for purposeful discrimination; loss of experience; and ten-
sion with reintegrative goals. 
A. RACIAL DISPARITY AND COVER FOR PURPOSEFUL 
DISCRIMINATION  
The exclusion of those with criminal records brings the risk 
of exacerbating racial disparity within the jury system. Because 
rates of criminalization vary according to race,67 jury exclusions 
relying on criminal records have a disparate impact,68 thus of-
fering an illustration of the notion that American criminal jus-
tice “systematically excludes racial minorities from its 
decisionmaking processes while disproportionately imposing its 
burdens on them.”69 The effect is dramatic. In 2003, Brian Kalt 
estimated that exclusion on the basis of felony convictions re-
duced the representation of African American men on juries by 
thirty percent.70
 
 66. Melynda J. Price, Performing Discretion or Performing Discrimina-
tion: Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 84–85, 90 (2009). 
 Kevin Johnson has pointed out that an analo-
gous disparity exists in the exclusion of Latinas and Latinos 
 67. See J. McGregor Smyth, Jr., From Arrest to Reintegration: A Model for 
Mitigating Collateral Consequences of Criminal Proceedings, CRIM. JUST., Fall 
2009, at 42, 43 (“African Americans and Latinos face significantly greater like-
lihood of being arrested, convicted, and incarcerated than whites.”). 
 68. See Robert J. Smith & Bidish J. Sarma, How and Why Race Continues 
to Influence the Administration of Criminal Justice in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. 
REV. 361, 406 (2012) (“[S]kewed enforcement of criminal laws (for example, 
disproportionate arrests for drug possession crime despite equal rates of drug 
use) has the collateral consequence of excluding a disproportionate number of 
black citizens from jury service.”). 
 69. Note, Judging the Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges 
Limits the Dangers of Prosecutorial Discretion, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2121, 2121 
(2006). 
 70. Kalt, supra note 7, at 113. 
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from jury service because of felony convictions.71 Similarly, Al-
exandra Natapoff has pointed out that an analogous racial dis-
parity exists in the distribution of misdemeanor convictions, 
which some courts can also use to exclude potential jurors.72
In addition to exacerbating racial disparity, these exclu-
sions may increase the ease with which purposeful discrimina-
tion can be effected in jury selection. Prosecutors continue to 
demonstrate a propensity to exercise peremptory challenges 
against jurors of color,
 
73 and when Batson claims from their ad-
versaries require them to justify these peremptory challenges, 
they often cite as a justification a connection between the chal-
lenged juror and the criminal justice system.74 Scholars and lit-
igants have claimed that the disparate impact of these justifi-
cations is no coincidence, that a connection with the criminal 
justice system is not race neutral,75 and that the asserted justi-
fications are merely a cover for purposeful discrimination on 
the basis of race or ethnicity.76
 
 71. See Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and 
Injustice, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 158 (2005) (mentioning “disqualifi-
cation of felons” as one of the mechanisms that bars “disproportionate num-
bers of Latina/os from serving on juries”). 
 These claims have not pre-
 72. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 
1372 (2012) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanors] (“[T]he petty offense ma-
chinery has become a way to formally label as ‘criminal’ thousands of vulnera-
ble individuals of color without regard to evidence of their individual culpabil-
ity.”); supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Sources of Racial Disenfran-
chisement in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 238, 
269 (1994) (“An important observation is that prosecutors are more likely to 
peremptorily challenge minorities than are defense attorneys.”). 
 74. See Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 12, at 1375 (men-
tioning prosecutorial justifications for peremptory challenges grounded in ju-
rors’ ties to criminal justice system). 
 75. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 130 (2010) (“A black 
kid arrested twice for possession of marijuana may be no more of a repeat of-
fender than a white frat boy who regularly smokes pot in his dorm room. But 
because of his race and his confinement to a racially segregated ghetto, the 
black kid has a criminal record, while the white frat boy, because of his race 
and relative privilege, does not. Thus, when prosecutors throw the book at 
black repeat offenders or when police stalk ex-offenders and subject them to 
regular frisks and searches on the grounds that it makes sense to ‘watch crim-
inals closely,’ they are often exacerbating racial disparities created by the dis-
cretionary decision to wage the War on Drugs almost exclusively in poor com-
munities of color.”); Price, supra note 66, at 95 (“The removal of African 
Americans for . . . familiarity with the criminal justice system . . . is, most ar-
guably, not race neutral.”). 
 76. See Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 12, at 1375–76 
(describing disparate impact arguments against facially “race-neutral” justifi-
cations for juror strikes). 
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vailed77: courts continue to find that the reason for a perempto-
ry challenge can be “race-neutral” in the sense required by Bat-
son even if it has a disparate impact,78 and that purposeful dis-
crimination cannot be established on this ground alone.79 Even 
while legal claims fail, scholarly calls persist for judges to police 
more carefully the risk that this type of justification masks 
purposeful discrimination.80
The harms brought about by racial disparity the risk of 
purposeful racial discrimination affect many groups. Those who 
have historically been disenfranchised may be kept once again 
from civic participation.
 
81 Those whose fates are determined by 
the jury may see their chances of a fair trial decrease since di-
verse juries outperform all-white juries in a number of key are-
as.82 Effects in this area can spiral, since some studies have 
shown that the whiter the jury, the more likely it is to convict 
people of color;83 those convicted may in turn be precluded from 
future jury service, and so on.84
 
 77. See id. at 1363, 1374–75 (demonstrating that in published federal cas-
es the prosecutorial justifications most commonly attacked as having a racially 
or ethnically disparate impact stemming from purposeful discrimination were 
those relating to the criminal justice system and that those claims of discrimi-
nation, when made on behalf of jurors of color, all ultimately failed). 
 
 78. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991). 
 79. Id. at 362–63. 
 80. See, e.g., Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 12, at 1417 
(calling for courts and critics to heed the risks of disparities in applying Bat-
son). 
 81. See Rubio v. Super. Ct., 593 P.2d 595, 605 n.11 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) 
(Tobriner, J., dissenting) (“Ironically, the political and social value of govern-
mental participation through jury service may be especially significant to 
groups historically disenfranchised and victimized by public and private dis-
crimination . . . .”).  
 82. See Leipold, supra note 18, at 1007 (“Even in cases in which the only 
questions were factual, more diverse juries would still enliven the debate, 
bring different life experiences to the table, and squelch the airing of stereo-
types that otherwise could harm the defendant.”); Samuel R. Sommers, On 
Racial Diversity and Group Decision-Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of 
Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 597, 608 (2006) (discussing a study suggesting that diverse groups 
deliberate longer, make fewer factual errors, are more likely to correct inaccu-
racies, and are more open-minded than all-white groups). 
 83. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An In-
vestigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 
7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 208 (2001). 
 84. See Smith & Sarma, supra note 68, at 363 (pointing out that factors 
such as discriminatory jury challenges cause “negative feedback loops that in-
hibit the ability of minority group members to participate meaningfully in the 
justice system and exact political change”). 
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Racially disparate exclusions threaten not only individuals 
and groups, but also the reputation of the jury. As Kevin John-
son puts it, racially skewed juries “undermine the perceived 
impartiality of the justice system and, at the most fundamental 
level, the rule of law.”85
B. LOSS OF EXPERIENCE 
 Thus, the racial inequities brought 
about by these exclusions jeopardize key values within the jury 
system: accuracy, impartiality, jury reputation, and the rule of 
law. As will be seen below, the very same values are cited as 
justifications for these exclusions, and thus are undermined 
even as they are purportedly being championed. 
To exclude from jury service those with criminal convic-
tions is to remove a certain type of experience from the jury; 
this should not be done lightly. Experience is a key part of the 
jury’s arsenal: jury instructions tell jurors to bring their experi-
ence to the task,86 thus appearing to acknowledge the fact that 
experience shapes interpretation of facts.87 Yet it is diversity of 
experience that shapes interpretation of facts in a way most 
consonant with our ideals of the jury: the jury’s ability to offer a 
“collective wisdom and body of experience” is part of what justi-
fies its existence.88 Thus, the exclusion of those who have direct 
experience of the criminal justice system risks creating bias 
even while being sought in the name of bias-removal.89
 
 85. Johnson, supra note 
 One 
state judge declared that “[w]hen any segment of the communi-
ty . . . is excluded as a matter of law from jury service based on 
stereotypes and innuendo, the representativeness of the jury is 
reduced and the jury loses one of a variety of perspectives on 
71, at 158. 
 86. Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should 
Voluntarily Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 406 
(2010); see People v. Wilson, 187 P.3d 1041, 1082 (Cal. 2008) (“[W]e expect ju-
rors to use their own life experiences when evaluating the evidence.”). 
 87. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Norma-
tive Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 400 (1996) (referenc-
ing cognitive theory to support claim that “[o]ne’s interpretation of the facts is 
influenced by one’s background and experience”); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Emp-
ty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (2000) (“An indi-
vidual’s experiences influence her capacity to interpret and evaluate facts and 
then to make judgments about justice.”). 
 88. Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1377–78 n.6 (E.D. Ark. 1980). 
 89. See State v. Haynes, 514 So. 2d 1206, 1211 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (de-
scribing statutory exclusion on the basis of felony conviction as “a reasonable 
qualification to insure lack of partiality, bias or prejudice in the trial of a crim-
inal case”). 
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human events.”90 She was discussing a proposal that law en-
forcement officers be automatically excluded,91
The judging of criminal cases may suffer from the absence 
of those with direct experience of the criminal justice system, 
since its workings are often not intuitive. Jurors are instructed 
to bring their “common sense” to their task,
 but her critiques 
of such a proposal—the lack of evidence of bias, and the nar-
rowing of the jury’s experience—also apply to the exclusion of 
those with criminal convictions. 
92 but laypersons’ 
common sense is often inadequate in the criminal justice are-
na.93 If a layperson tries to imagine him- or herself in a sus-
pect’s position, for example, it might defy common sense to im-
agine that a suspect would “confess” in the absence of guilt.94 
Yet interrogation techniques are often designed to defy common 
sense, by making it appear as if giving a statement would be in 
the suspect’s best interest.95
 
 90. State v. Louis, 457 N.W.2d 484, 491 (Wis. 1990) (Abrahamson, J., con-
curring); id. at 482 (majority opinion) (finding the assumption that law en-
forcement officials are implicitly biased against defendants “unfounded”). 
 Unique pressures act upon those 
caught up in the criminal justice system—not only to give a 
 91. Id. at 491 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). For another example of law 
enforcement officers escaping a presumption that they harbor a bias, see State 
v. Sharrow, 949 A.2d 428, 436 (Vt. 2008) (“[I]nferring bias to a seasoned police-
academy teacher on the basis of this status alone would effectively disqualify 
him from jury service for any case involving police-officer witnesses. It is simp-
ly not necessary to do so in order to preserve the right to trial by impartial ju-
ry where a defendant has an opportunity show actual bias.”). 
 92. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“The purpose of a 
jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the 
commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous 
or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps 
overconditioned or biased response of a judge.”); Howard, supra note 86, at 406 
(“[J]urors are instructed by the judge to draw on their life experiences and 
common sense in deciding the case.”). 
 93. See Lisa Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence 
Rules Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 261, 
265 (“Because jurors are untrained and generally unfamiliar with the justice 
system, they often lack the experience and knowledge required to evaluate the 
prosecution’s evidence.”). 
 94. Nadia Soree, When the Innocent Speak: False Confessions, Constitu-
tional Safeguards, and the Role of Expert Testimony, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 
196 (2005) (“[C]ommon sense tells us that innocent suspects do not confess to 
crimes they have not committed.”). 
 95. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess False-
ly: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 990 (1997) 
(“Once a suspect fully appreciates his dismal situation, the investigator can 
influence him to admit guilt if he is led to believe that making an admission 
will improve his position.”). 
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“confession,”96 but also to take a plea,97 and to cooperate.98 
Those who have been through the criminal justice system as 
defendants may be able to understand those pressures in a way 
inaccessible to others. In addition, the common sense of the un-
initiated may suggest that those sworn to uphold the law—
prosecutors and police—can be relied upon to act with integrity, 
and indeed laypersons generally place tremendous confidence 
in the integrity of prosecutors and police.99 Research into prose-
cutorial and police misconduct indicates that such confidence is 
often misplaced.100
The growing body of data on wrongful convictions, particu-
larly with respect to three of the leading characteristics of 
wrongful convictions cases, heightens the importance of skepti-
cism regarding the easy exclusion of those with direct experi-
ence of the criminal justice system. The National Registry of 




 96. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (including 
“False Confessions / Admissions” as one of the four leading causes of wrongful 
convictions in the first 225 DNA exonerations). 
 and this 
figure is likely to be only a tiny fraction of the cases where ex-
 97. The uninitiated may assume, in assessing defendant testimony, that a 
defendant would not have garnered a prior conviction, by plea or after a trial, 
if he or she were not morally culpable, as well as indubitably guilty. These as-
sumptions can be misguided. 9.6% of those in the national exoneration regis-
try pled guilty. Exoneration Detail List, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visit-
ed Nov. 4, 2013).  
 98. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, supra note 96 (identifying “in-
formants” as one of the four leading causes of wrongful convictions). Inform-
ants, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ 
Snitches-Informants.php (Nov. 4, 2013) (pointing out that “[i]n more than 15% 
of wrongful conviction cases overturned through DNA testing, an informant 
testified against the defendant at the original trial”). 
 99. See Nancy Gertner, Is the Jury Worth Saving?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 923, 
931 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE 
AMERICAN COURTROOM (1994)) (“The public, with few exceptions, has enor-
mous faith in the skill and integrity of police and prosecutors.”). 
 100. See Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., Why Police Lie Under Oath, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/why 
-police-officers-lie-under-oath.html (pointing out the incentives for police offic-
ers to testify falsely, and claiming that “[i]n this era of mass incarceration, the 
police shouldn’t be trusted any more than any other witness, perhaps less so”); 
Michael L. Volkov & Allyson Miller, Prosecutorial Misconduct: An Increasing 
Problem or Overblown Hysteria?, PROSECUTION NOTES (Ctr. on the Admin. of 
Criminal Law, New York, N.Y.), 2010, at 7 (“[R]ecent studies show that prose-
cutorial misconduct is a systemic reality, at least at the state and local levels 
of the criminal justice system.”). 
 101. Exoneration Detail List, supra note 97. 
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oneration is merited.102 The hundreds of jury trials within this 
group of cases indicate that juries have been making mis-
takes.103 More specifically, three of the most common character-
istics of wrongful conviction cases correlate with areas where 
laypersons’ common sense might be inadequate.104 False confes-
sions, for example, are a leading characteristic of wrongful con-
viction cases;105 their falsity may be hard to detect if one cannot 
imagine why someone would admit to something that never oc-
curred,106 and indeed jurors do fail to understand the phenome-
non of false confessions.107 Informant testimony is another lead-
ing characteristic of wrongful conviction cases.108
 
 102. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EX-
ONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012, at 3 (2012) 
(“The most important conclusion of this Report is that there are far more false 
convictions than exonerations. That should come as no surprise. The essential 
fact about false convictions is that they are generally invisible: if we could spot 
them, they’d never happen in the first place. Why would anyone suppose that 
the small number of miscarriages of justice that we learn about years later—
like the handful of fossils of early hominids that we have discovered—is any-
thing more than an insignificant fraction of the total?”). 
 One may fully 
credit it if one is unaware of the kinds of pressures that might 
 103. Only 118 of the 1238 cases listed in the National Registry of Exonera-
tions were resolved by guilty plea. Exoneration Detail List, supra note 97. 
 104. See Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 591, 624 (2009) (explaining that laypersons’ common sense can 
be unreliable in the areas of eyewitness evidence, false confessions, informant 
testimony, and forensic science evidence). 
 105. False Confessions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject 
.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (“In about 
25% of DNA exoneration cases, innocent defendants made incriminating 
statements, delivered outright confessions or pled guilty.”). 
 106. See Findley, supra note 104, at 628 (“[C]ommon sense about false con-
fessions can be quite wrong. Simply put, it is counterintuitive to believe that a 
person would confess to a crime, especially a serious crime, that she did not 
commit.”). 
 107. See id. (“[T]he empirical evidence is there: people do confess falsely 
and to the most heinous of crimes. Research confirms that jurors do not un-
derstand this reality about confessions.”); Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of 
the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1271, 1280 (2005) (“[A] confession is given tremendous weight by a jury, re-
sulting in defendants being convicted on the basis of a confession even in the 
absence of evidence corroborating the confession.”). 
 108. Informant testimony is “the leading cause of wrongful convictions in 
capital cases.” CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM (2004–
05), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/SnitchSystemBooklet 
.pdf (describing fifty-one wrongful convictions that involved perjured inform-
ant testimony that the jurors credited); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: 
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 3 (2009) 
[hereinafter NATAPOFF, SNITCHING] (stating that the use of criminal inform-
ants is “clandestine and unregulated,” and invites inaccuracy). 
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impair its accuracy,109 and indeed jurors typically credit in-
formant testimony.110 Government misconduct, a third leading 
characteristic of wrongful conviction cases,111
To explore the benefits of lay participation by those who 
know something of the pressures and fractures of the criminal 
justice system is not to urge that jurors with convictions act as 
experts. It is, rather, to agree with Akhil Reed Amar that “a ju-
ror should have an open mind but not an empty mind.”
 might go unde-
tected if one has never had anything but positive experiences at 
the hands of law enforcement. 
112 In 
other contexts, policymakers have started to realize that fair 
jurors do not need to be ignorant of the system.113
 
 109. See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 815, 854 (2007) (“Prosecutors . . . commonly use the testimony of 
some offenders as a means to facilitate prosecution of others, granting the tes-
tifying criminal reduced punishment (by way of sentencing departures for 
‘substantial assistance’ and the like) or no punishment (by way of a ‘coopera-
tion agreement’ or a grant of witness immunity) as an inducement.”).  
 In New York, 
for example, the former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, 
Judith Kaye, proudly announced the expansion of jury service 
 110. See NATAPOFF, SNITCHING, supra note 108, at 77 (“[N]umerous exon-
erations reveal just how often juries believe lying criminal informants, even 
when juries know that the informant is being compensated and has the incen-
tive to lie.”). 
 111. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, supra note 96 (listing “gov-
ernment misconduct” as one of the seven most common causes of wrongful 
convictions); Government Misconduct, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www 
.innocenceproject.org/understand/Government-Misconduct.php (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2013) (“The cases of wrongful convictions uncovered by DNA testing 
are filled with evidence of negligence, fraud or misconduct by prosecutors or 
police departments.”). 
 112. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1180, 1182 (1995); id. at 1182 (“The jury—and not just 
the venire—should be as cross-sectional of the entire community of the whole 
people as possible.”); see also Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 n.7 
(E.D. Ark. 1980) (“If all members of a religious group which believed in polyg-
amy were excluded for cause in a bigamy trial simply because they were mem-
bers of that religion, this would deprive the defendant of a ‘representative’ ju-
ry.”); Smith & Sarma, supra note 68, at 405 (“[P]rosecutors successfully 
eliminate many people of color through discriminatory jury selection even 
though many live in the areas where the crimes are committed, understand 
the police conduct in those areas, and live with the situational pressures and 
constraints that define such locations.”). 
 113. See Michael B. Mushlin, Bound and Gagged: The Peculiar Predica-
ment of Professional Jurors, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 251 n.54 (2007) (cit-
ing a 2001 report on the New York changes stating that “members of the legal 
profession who are no longer exempt from service find jury service particularly 
valuable, as it offers a view of the legal system from a juror’s seat and provides 
new perspective”). 
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eligibility to include lawyers and others, and emphasized an ef-
fort to accumulate diverse experience: 
We do not require jurors to check their life experiences at the court-
room door, nor could we. In fact, one of the goals of New York’s jury 
reform was to eliminate all automatic exemptions from service, bring-
ing to the jury room a wide array of individuals with specialized 
knowledge and training.114
This reform did not address the continuing exclusion of those 
with felony records.
 
115 Indeed, New York’s juror orientation vid-
eo ignores the very existence of this group of people in announc-
ing that “[t]oday our jury pools represent the entire community, 
in all its diversity.”116
C. TENSION WITH REINTEGRATIVE GOALS 
 True reform will not occur until the ex-
clusion of those with criminal convictions, and the assumptions 
on which that exclusion is based, are acknowledged, and ad-
dressed. 
These exclusions are also in tension with ideals of reentry, 
which is “the process by which individuals return to communi-
ties from prison or jail custody,”117 and reintegration, which can 
be thought of as “the ultimate goal.”118 The tension lies in both 
the removal of an opportunity for civic inclusion and the mes-
sage about the unfitness of those with criminal convictions that 
is sent both to those excluded and to those included.119
 
 114. People v. Arnold, 753 N.E. 846, 854 (N.Y. 2001) (footnote omitted). 
  
 115. Paula Z. Segal, A More Inclusive Democracy: Challenging Felon Jury 
Exclusion in New York, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 313, 332 (2010) (“Despite the rec-
ognized need to expand the jury pool in New York, felon jury inclusion was 
conspicuously absent from Justice Kaye’s admirable reforms.”). 
 116. See Videotape: Your Turn (Ted Steed Productions, Inc. 1997), availa-
ble at http://nyjuror.gov/JO_VideoScripts.shtml (Petit Jury Orientation). 
 117. ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COM-
MUNITIES: REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS 1 (2008).  
 118. Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Col-
lateral Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1084 n.71 (2004) (“The terms ‘reentry’ and ‘reinte-
gration’ tend to be used interchangeably in this context. However, some have 
observed these to be distinct concepts. For instance, one commentator observes 
that reentry is the process by which an ex-offender leaves confinement and 
returns to his or her community, while reintegration is the ultimate goal.” (cit-
ing Jeremy Travis, Address at the University of Maryland School of Law 
(Sept. 8, 2003))). 
 119. See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Re-
strictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
153, 160 (1999) (“Many collateral consequences, therefore, seem to ‘fit more 
appropriately with the discarded idea that an offender should be eliminated or 
banished from society.’ That goal, however, makes reintegration and member-
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Reentry has gained recent prominence as a focus in crimi-
nal justice policy.120 One of the types of activity that has been 
found to aid the possibility of reentry is civic participation. 
Some judges, legislators, and commentators have recognized 
the potential of voting, for example, to aid the reintegration of 
those with felony convictions.121 The potential seems stronger 
with jury service, which, unlike voting, requires serious and ex-
tended “civic interchange,”122 and which increases the likelihood 
of participation in future forms of civic engagement.123 Thus, 
one judge has applied the voting precedent to the jury context, 
urging that the same potential be recognized.124
 
ship in society elusive.” (quoting Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. 
REV. 403, 423 (1967))). 
 Other judges 
have noted the tension between jury exclusion and reintegra-
 120. See Pinard, supra note 118, at 1083–84 (“Very recently, advocates, 
scholars, social scientists, policy analysts, politicians, media, and numerous 
grassroots organizations have begun to focus on various issues relating to ex-
offender reentry.”); id. at 1085–87 (giving examples of federal and state ex-
offender reentry initiatives).  
 121. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (denying the right to vote “is a hindrance to the efforts of society to 
rehabilitate former felons and convert them into law-abiding and productive 
citizens” (quoting Memorandum of the Secretary of State of California in Op-
position to Certiorari, Class of Cnty. Clerks & Registrars v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 
904 (1974) (No. 72-324))); DEMOS, RESTORING VOTING RIGHTS TO CITIZENS 
WITH FELONY CONVICTIONS (2003–04) (“If we want former felons to become 
good citizens, we must give them rights as well as responsibilities, and there is 
no greater responsibility than voting.” (quoting U.S. Rep. John Conyers, Jr.)); 
Op-Ed., Disenfranchised Felons, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, http://www 
.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/opinion/disenfranchised-felons.html (“Former offend-
ers who are allowed to vote are less likely to return to prison and more likely 
to become reintegrated into their communities.”). 
 122. Kalt, supra note 7, at 128; see Demleitner, supra note 119, at 161 
(pointing out that a rationale for restrictions that separates those with crimi-
nal convictions from others leads “to societal fragmentation and thwarts pos-
sible rehabilitation”); Judge Paul J. Garotto, Speech Before the Omaha Bar 
Association (Sept. 24, 1964), in Jury Service—A Citizen’s Duty, 13 NEB. ST. B. 
J. 111, 112 (1964) (“Jury service is a duty that most citizens apparently seek to 
avoid, or wish they could. It is the kind of basic common experience that all 
citizens, bar none, should have at least once. . . . [S]itting through a trial as a 
member of the jury, and then seeking with the other eleven jurors to reach a 
just and fair and unanimous verdict is a very enlightening and enriching ex-
perience.” (emphasis added)); id. at 113 (“What else do we have that can teach, 
exercise, and strengthen so much political, social, moral and religious virtue 
as does serving on a jury?”). 
 123. See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The Verdict on Juries, 91 JUDICA-
TURE 226, 226–27, 230 (2008) (“[J]ury service can increase other forms of civic 
participation such as voting.”). 
 124. See Rubio v. Super. Ct., 593 P.2d 595, 604–05 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) 
(Tobriner, J., dissenting). 
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tion.125
serves the legitimate government objective of providing convicted fel-
ons with the opportunity to participate in the American judicial pro-
cess once their sentences have been served. Thus, [the Colorado stat-
ute] is rationally related to the legitimate legislative purpose of 
rehabilitating convicted felons and reintegrating them into society 
once their punishment is complete.
 Most notably, a Colorado appeals court found that be-
cause of the reintegrative benefits of jury service, the legisla-
ture acted rationally in lifting the automatic exclusion of those 
with felony convictions, and that the resulting statute: 
126
In addition to removing the opportunity to participate in an in-
clusionary activity, automatic exclusions have expressive pow-
er.
 
127 They send to convicted individuals a message of “you do 
not belong”—and in many instances “you will never belong”128—
that is at odds with the demand that one “reenter.” The label-
ing and stigmatizing involved in this kind of exclusion inter-
feres with efforts at reentry.129
 
 125. See, e.g., Froede v. Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co., 523 N.W.2d 849, 852 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (drawing connection between the lifting of automatic 
bans and reintegration, at least in the context of civil jury service). 
 In addition, it sends a message 
to the broader community that reinforces, instead of challeng-
ing, perceptions of those with convictions as “other,” and indeed 
as a dangerous other. As Dorothy Roberts has written, “[b]y 
denying felons the opportunity to participate in legal processes 
such as voting, jury service, and holding public office . . . mass 
incarceration reinforces internal social norms that treat these 
processes as illegitimate as well as the external perception of 
 126. People v. Ellis, 148 P. 3d 205, 211 (Colo. App. 2006), cert. denied, 2006 
WL 3393584 (Colo. 2006) (affirming guilty verdict reached by a jury containing 
a juror with a felony conviction, in relation to whom the trial judge had reject-
ed a cause challenge). 
 127. See Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, 
Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1032–33 (2004) (“These punishments point to one way 
of imagining the criminal offender. Not only does the criminal offender betray 
her immoral character but that character is permanent. The criminal’s bad 
character places her into an inferior class of citizens. The offender is to be 
permanently locked away if possible. Her vote is taken away permanently, her 
claim to political equality denied. The criminal is barred from sitting on a jury, 
participating in government, sharing in social and welfare rights and taking 
full part in her economic wellbeing. A class system based on permanent moral 
inferiority makes the criminal a permanent lesser citizen.”). 
 128. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of lifetime bans and other reper-
cussions faced by those with convictions. 
 129. See Demleitner, supra note 119, at 161 (“If [collateral consequences] 
are not discontinued within a reasonable period of time, they will interfere 
with the ex-offender’s rehabilitative efforts by continuing to stigmatize and 
label him.”). 
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these communities as outside the national polity.”130 Thus, leg-
islation in this area plays a part in confirming anti-
reintegrative stereotypes131 rather than seizing the opportunity 
to shift prejudices by showing people in a new role132
The assumption conveyed by these exclusions—that those 
with a criminal record are civically unfit—may help reveal why 
concrete commitments to reentry goals have often appeared 
halting.
: that of 
civic participant.  
133 If reentry goals remain desirable, then these exclu-
sions, and other aspects of the criminal justice system,134 may 
have to be rethought.135 George Fletcher has explored this no-
tion in the context of voting, arguing that “[o]nce we 
acknowledge the necessity of reintegration, we could hardly 
maintain the practice of disenfranchising felons.”136
 
 130. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration 
in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1293 (2004) [here-
inafter Roberts, Cost of Mass Incarceration]. 
 He held 
 131. See Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 
BERK. J. CRIM. L. 259, 265–67 (2011) [hereinafter Dolovich, Exclusion and 
Control] (pointing out the dehumanization of those whom the state incarcer-
ates, and arguing that “a political strategy emphasizing the financial costs of 
incarceration is bound to fail unless it also generates an ideological reorienta-
tion towards recognizing the people the state incarcerates as fellow human be-
ings and fellow citizens, entitled to respect and consideration as such”). 
 132. See CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI: AND OTHER CLUES TO 
HOW STEREOTYPES AFFECT US 6–7 (2011). 
 133. See David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 32 (2011) (“Funding for [reentry and reintegration] pro-
grams remains manifestly insufficient, so much so that Loïc Wacquant has 
dismissed reentry as ‘myth and ceremony.’” (quoting Loïc Wacquant, Prisoner 
Reentry as Myth and Ceremony, 34 DIALECT. ANTHROPOL. 605 (2010))); Love, 
supra note 19 (“Social liberals and fiscal conservatives alike pay lip service to 
the supposed American ideal of second chances. But our language, like our 
law, points in the opposite direction.”). The funding appropriated for reentry 
programs pursuant to the Second Chance Act, which was signed into law by 
George W. Bush in 2007, “has been far less than is needed to create meaning-
ful possibilities for successful reintegration.” Dolovich, Exclusion and Control, 
supra note 131, at 337 n.251. 
 134. See George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflec-
tions on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1895, 1907 (1999). 
 135. Note that critics such as Michelle Alexander would require much more 
in order to regard the use of the phrase “reentry” as making any sense. See 
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 9 (2011) (al-
luding to the absurdity of the concept of people “re-entering” a society “that 
never seemed to have much use for them in the first place”). 
 136. Fletcher, supra note 134, at 1907 (“The challenge of recognizing that 
we implicitly endorse a caste system in criminal law is to reformulate our the-
ories of punishment. The emphasis on reintegration into society should come 
front and center. Once we acknowledge the necessity of reintegration, we could 
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back from extending his critique to exclusions of those with fel-
ony convictions from jury service—calling such exclusion “al-
most reasonable”137
III.  THE JUSTIFICATIONS   
—and yet the same critique applies.  
In Part III, this Article turns from the harms of jury exclu-
sion, laid out in Part II, to their justifications. This Part de-
scribes and critiques four of the most commonly asserted justi-
fications138
A. PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
: public perception, juror character, the “purity” of 
the jury, and embitterment against the system. 
One common justification for these exclusions is that the 
reputation of the jury would be compromised by the inclusion of 
those with criminal—especially felony—convictions. Judges en-
dorse the rationale that exclusion of those with felony convic-
tions is related to efforts to achieve a “reputable and reliable 
jury . . . whose judgment society can respect,”139
 
hardly maintain the practice of disenfranchising felons. On the contrary, we 
should be encouraging inmates to begin thinking of themselves as useful 
members of society with all the attendant responsibilities. Having the respon-
sibility to vote should be the minimum condition for inculcating the sense that 
felons too are citizens.”). 
 and invoke the 
 137. Id. at 1906. 
 138. Note that courts are often reluctant to offer any justifications. See, 
e.g., State v. Folkerts, 629 P.2d 173, 177 (Kan. 1981) (stating that those with a 
felony conviction would be unfit “for obvious reasons”). This Article adopts the 
position that assumptions upon which components of the criminal justice sys-
tem rest should be spelled out, and that only those that are convincing should 
be adopted. 
 139. United States v. Best, 214 F. Supp. 2d 897, 905 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (hold-
ing that the rationale especially applies to the bar on jury service by convicted 
felons); see United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ran-
dolph, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“If [a juror with a felony 
conviction is summoned for jury duty and] is discovered before trial, presuma-
bly he is excluded without further ado . . . not because of an inference, arising 
out of the identities of the parties and other circumstances of a particular case, 
that he will be biased for one side or against the other, but rather because 
Congress determined that he ought not sit on any jury, determine the fate of 
any party, under any circumstances, in any case. That judgment reflects con-
cern about maintaining the integrity of the jury . . . and with it, public confi-
dence in verdicts. As Justice Kennedy recently put it, ‘the purpose of the jury 
system is to impress upon the criminal defendant and the community as a 
whole that a verdict of acquittal is given in accordance with the law by persons 
who are fair.’ Congress, I believe, adopted what is no doubt the traditional 
view—reflected elsewhere in our law—that felons are generally less trustwor-
thy and responsible than others, and that they just cannot be counted on to be 
‘fair.’” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991))). 
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importance of “maintaining the integrity of the jury . . . and 
with it, public confidence in verdicts.”140
As with the other primary justifications, no empirical sup-
port is given for the idea that the public would realize, care 
about, or despair at the presence of someone with a criminal 
conviction on the jury. Word has not yet arrived, for example, of 
a jury crisis in Colorado and Maine, the two states that have no 
conviction-based exclusions from jury service.
 
141
The public perception rationale not only lacks support, but 
also runs up against three countervailing public perception 
concerns. First, any exclusion that removes a sector of the 
community risks damaging public perception, since, as the Su-
preme Court stated in Taylor v. Louisiana, community partici-
pation is “critical to public confidence in the fairness of the 
criminal justice system.”
 Yet it may be 
that these exclusions provide their own rationale, since the eas-
iest way to ensure that those with felony convictions are seen 
as inappropriate civic participants is to enforce and endorse 
their exclusion. Those bringing about these exclusions, in other 
words, should consider the power of the law either to reinforce 
or to challenge stereotypes.  
142 Even as courts and legislatures 
trumpet “integrity,” in the sense of “probity,”143 these exclusions 
jeopardize the value of “integrity,” in the sense of “wholeness.” 
Perhaps most damaging to public perception of community rep-
resentation on juries has been the history of racial disparity 
and discrimination in jury selection.144 As stated above, these 
exclusions risk exacerbating both.145
A second countervailing concern is that in other spheres of 
decisionmaking about alleged law-breakers, participation as 
judges by those who have been through the system is lauded 
rather than shunned. Youth courts, for example, in which those 
 
 
 140. Boney, 977 F.2d at 642; see also Hoffman v. State, 922 S.W.2d 663, 667 
(Tex. App. 1996) (mentioning “the wish of the state of Texas to preserve the 
integrity of its jury system by precluding convicted felons from sitting on ju-
ries”). 
 141. See supra Part I.B. 
 142. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
 143. Boney, 977 F.2d at 642; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 561.026 cmt. to 1973 
proposed code (2012) (“Many states permit persons with felony records to 
serve on juries. However, the Committee decided to exclude all convicted fel-
ons from jury service (unless pardoned) in order to help maintain the integrity 
of the jury system.”). 
 144. See Leipold, supra note 18, at 986 (noting harm to “public perception 
of trial fairness” when lawyers remove all African American jurors). 
 145. See supra Part II.A. 
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who have been held accountable for adjudicated transgressions 
return to the system in order to determine the fate of someone 
in their former position, have been widely adopted.146
A final countervailing concern relates to the limited con-
ception of the “public” that this reliance on “public perception” 
seems to adopt. Those with criminal convictions—and those 
who care about their fate—are members of the public. Indeed, 
they are a significant portion of the public: in America, one in 
four adults has a criminal record.
 Admitted-
ly, the fact that an activity engaged in by young people receives 
acclaim does not guarantee the same for an adult analog, but 
the success of this model, under which experience operates as a 
boon rather than a bar, undermines the assumption that those 
who have been found guilty are destroyed as fair 
decisionmakers. 
147 Thus, if courts and legisla-
tures care about “public confidence” in verdicts, they must care 
not only about possible concerns relating to inclusion on juries, 
but also possible concerns relating to exclusion. Exclusionary 
policies risk creating a sense of alienation from the law.148 Poli-
cymakers have started to address that sort of risk, through 
programs such as community policing,149 and community prose-
cution.150 They must also address it as they evaluate policies of 
jury exclusion.151
 
 146. See THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF TEEN COURT ON YOUNG 
OFFENDERS 2 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410457 
.pdf (describing youth courts as “very popular,” and estimating their number 
at more than 800). 
 
 147. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 15 (2008), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
bjs/grants/228661.pdf. 
 148. See Johnson, supra note 71, at 193 (“Attention should be given to 
whether barring felons from jury service continues to make sense in light of 
what we suspect about unequal operation of the modern criminal justice sys-
tem. The racially skewed impacts of the criminal justice system have ripple 
effects on jury service and tends to diminish Latina/o representation on civil 
and criminal juries, thus undermining the legitimacy of the judicial system in 
the eyes of the Latina/o community.”). 
 149. Community policing emphasizes partnership with the community, in 
order to achieve goals such as “crime prevention [and] order maintenance.” 
Matthew J. Parlow, The Great Recession and Its Implications for Community 
Policing, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1193, 1197 (2012). 
 150. Community prosecution expands the goals of community policing into 
the prosecution context, emphasizing the importance of “increased community 
input.” Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 323, 368 (2004). 
 151. See Leipold, supra note 18, at 1007 (“The proper working of the crimi-
nal process depends on broad societal support for its goals and methods; these 
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B. JUROR CHARACTER 
Exclusions of those with criminal convictions are often jus-
tified on the basis that certain character flaws are revealed by 
a criminal conviction and are inconsistent with jury service.152 
Indeed, one of the purported benefits of a statutory system of 
exclusions was that it marked a move away from the earlier 
method of discretionary “good character” determinations by ju-
ry commissioners and toward objectivity153
Thus, on the basis of criminal convictions, courts make a 
variety of assumptions about the nature of potential jurors’ 
character and their resultant unfitness. One character trait 
that is commonly said to be missing in those with felony convic-
tions, and is therefore used to justify jury exclusion, is “probi-
ty.”
: the statutory sys-
tem held out the promise of a clear and objective divide be-
tween those who had convictions and were therefore unfit and 
those who had none and were therefore fit. 
154
 
can be best understood by those who have listened, deliberated, and pro-
nounced a verdict on a fellow citizen.”); Tom Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Fu-
ture Challenges in the Study of Legitimacy and Criminal Justice 17 (Yale Law 
Sch., Public Law Working Paper No. 264, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2141322 (noting the great importance of “moral alignment—the be-
lief that the police, the courts and the law enforce shared community values 
that reflect the person’s sense of what is right”).  
 In addition, according to one court, those with felony con-
 152. See, e.g., New Mexico Fiscal Impact Report, H.B. 0531, available at 
http://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/06%20Regular/firs/HB0531.pdf (2006) (“[The Office 
of the Attorney General] asserts that restricting felons from juries would as-
sist in ensuring that juries consist of law-abiding citizens of approved integri-
ty, good character, and sound judgment who are most likely to perform their 
jury service with the proper respect for the law.”). 
 153. See Anderson v. State, 542 So. 2d 292, 302 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (“‘It 
is obvious that the [relevant federal statutes] seek to limit disqualification to a 
few objective factors that most would agree are disabling. The effect should be 
to eliminate subjectivity in the selection process and increase the representa-
tiveness of the panel.’” (quoting HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SE-
LECTION 35 (1985))). 
 154. See United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (exclud-
ing those with felony convictions is rationally related to the legitimate interest 
in protecting the probity of juries); United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 
(1st Cir. 1979) (the disqualification laid out by the federal statute “is intended 
to assure the ‘probity’ of the jury” (quoting H.R. REP. No.90-1076, at 1796)); 
State v. Madoil, 12 Fla. 151, 163 (1867) (noting that if a juror had been con-
victed of an infamous crime, it would be the duty of the appellate court to 
award a new trial, “for juries must be ‘probi et legales homines’”); H. R. REP. 
No. 90-1076, at 1796 (“The bill . . . contains some guarantee of ‘probity’ at least 
to the extent that persons are disqualified who have charges pending against 
them for, or have been convicted of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for 
more than one year.”). 
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victions “are generally less trustworthy and responsible than 
others,” and cannot be counted on to be “fair.”155 Some courts 
center their concern on moral character, as in Texas, where 
there is said to be a “great interest in protecting against the 
“pollution of [the state’s] jury system” by excluding from jury 
service those “persons whose moral status has been judicially 
established as criminal.”156
In the criminal justice system as currently configured, this 
criterion fails to justify automatic exclusion: it fails with suffi-
cient accuracy to sort those who have violated the law from 
those who have not, and it fails to supply an adequate proxy for 
a character unfit for jury service.  
 
First, the label of “criminal conviction” fails with sufficient 
accuracy to sort those who have violated the law from those 
who have not.157 The increasingly prominent phenomenon of the 
wrongful conviction provides one obvious illustration.158 The 
risk of wrongful convictions may be particularly high with al-
leged misdemeanors, since the means of determining guilt are 
particularly blunt, or nonexistent, in those cases.159 Yet com-
mon to both felony and misdemeanor charges is the overwhelm-
ing pressure to take a plea,160
 
 155. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, 
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see United States v. Evans, 192 
F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that “grand theft” is a “serious crime,” 
which could have provoked a peremptory challenge “based on concerns about 
[the previously convicted juror’s] truthfulness, her commitment to following 
the law or her attitude towards the criminal justice system”); State v. Prince, 
250 P.3d 1145, 1159 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) (“Section 21–201 [disqualifying 
those with felony convictions] sets forth general qualifications for jury service 
and reflects the policy that jurors should be ‘citizens who uphold and obey the 
law.’” (quoting State v. Bojorquez, 535 P.2d 6, 12 (Ariz. 1975))). 
 and the limited judicial oversight 
 156. Amaya v. State, 220 S.W. 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920). 
 157. See Symposium, Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Crimi-
nal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 637 (2012) (“Conviction rates 
are not a valid proxy for commission rates.”); cf. Bojorquez, 535 P.2d at 12 
(“Requiring jurors to be electors attempts to insure that citizens who uphold 
and obey the law will be selected as jurors to discharge the responsibility of 
jury service.”).  
 158. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 570 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics] 
(“[T]he criminal process as it is currently constructed tends to narrow the gap 
between the odds of convicting the guilty and the odds of convicting the inno-
cent.”). 
 159. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 72, at 1370 (“[T]he misdemeanor 
process widely confers criminal records . . . on potentially innocent people 
without checking whether they are actually guilty or not.”). 
 160. See Cahill, supra note 109, at 853 (“Well over ninety percent of cases 
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of the plea bargaining process.161 Nor are the vulnerabilities of 
this sorting device limited to the final stages of a case. The 
criminal justice system is made up of a series of discretionary 
decisions that help determine who ends up with a conviction, 
and who does not162: whether an alleged crime is reported;163 
where, whom, and how to police;164 whether to arrest;165 wheth-
er and how to charge;166 whether to dismiss,167 divert,168
 
are resolved with guilty pleas, almost all of which involve plea bargains, trad-
ing off a lesser amount of punishment in return for a certain conviction. The 
federal sentencing guidelines make the ‘plea discount’ explicit by reducing an 
offender’s guideline sentence if he ‘clearly demonstrates acceptance of respon-
sibility,’ which generally requires a plea of guilty.” (quoting U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2006))); Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: 
Plea-Bargaining’s Innocence Problem and the Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH 
L. REV. 51, 84–86 (asserting that “it is clear that plea-bargaining has an inno-
cence problem,” and surveying estimates). 
 or par-
 161. See Cahill, supra note 109, at 817 (stating that in the area of plea bar-
gaining, federal prosecutors engage in “unguided and unreviewable exercises 
of prosecutorial discretion in individual cases”). 
 162. See Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 261, 268–69 (2003); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Be-
tween Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1997) 
[hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship] (“[T]he criminal justice system is 
characterized by extraordinary discretion—over the definition of crimes (legis-
latures can criminalize as much as they wish), over enforcement (police and 
prosecutors can arrest and charge whom they wish), and over funding (legisla-
tures can allocate resources as they wish).”). 
 163. See DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT’S, RAPE AND SEXUAL AS-
SAULT: REPORTING TO POLICE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, 1992–2000 at 3 
(2002) (suggesting that 54% of alleged rapes are not reported to the police). 
 164. Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 123, 125 (2008) (“The search for drugs has animated policing practices that 
increase racial disparities in encounters with the police, and also disparities in 
the ratings and outcomes of those encounters.”); William J. Stuntz, The Politi-
cal Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 784 (2006) (local 
police and prosecutors “focus too much attention on the crimes of the poor and 
too little on the crimes of the middle class”). 
 165. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 506 (“[T]he law 
does not by itself determine who is and isn’t punished. Some criminals evade 
detection, police and prosecutors frequently decline to arrest or charge, and 
juries sometimes refuse to convict.”). 
 166. Husak, supra note 162, at 269 (stating that “relevantly similar” people 
who are prosecuted may be charged with different crimes). 
 167. See BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., DO RACE AND ETHNICITY MATTER IN 
PROSECUTION? A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 
(2012) (identifying six prosecutorial discretion points: initial screening, pretri-
al release and bail procedure, dismissal, charge reduction, guilty plea, and 
sentencing). 
 168. See Willacy v. State, 640 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 1994) (holding that a 
juror was not statutorily disqualified under a state statute disqualifying, inter 
alia, those “under prosecution for any crime,” since the juror was enrolled in 
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don;169 whether to offer something in return for a plea bar-
gain,170 or for cooperation,171 and if so what; whether the ju-
rors—or, in some states, most of the jurors172—make the subjec-
tive decision to convict;173 whether defense attorneys have the 
wherewithal to bring a successful defense or appeal.174 Where 
there is discretion there is the risk of disparity,175 and indeed 
racial and/or ethic disparities have been found at each of the 
main points of prosecutorial discretion.176
 
“pretrial intervention program,” and “[p]retrial intervention is merely an al-
ternative to prosecution” (quoting Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 
1982) (holding that “[t]he pretrial intervention program is merely an alterna-
tive to prosecution and should remain in the prosecutor’s discretion”))). 
 Where there is discre-
 169. See Dafna Linzer & Jennifer LaFleur, Presidential Pardons Heavily 
Favor Whites, PRO PUBLICA (Dec. 3, 2011, 11:00PM), http://www.propublica 
.org/article/shades-of-mercy-presidential-forgiveness-heavily-favors-whites. 
 170. See Cahill, supra note 109, at 817. 
 171. See Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise 
of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 
299 (2004) (describing the “inequality and disparities” involved in the award-
ing of “substantial-assistance departures”); Cahill, supra note 109, at 854. 
 172. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 87, at 1263 (describing the “emerg-
ing acceptance of non-unanimous verdicts in criminal cases, in which ten or 
sometimes nine of twelve jurors are permitted to issue the verdict”). 
 173. See Gary T. Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A 
Critical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. REV. 939, 942 (1978) (“[A] trier of fact is free to 
ignore the evidence in acquitting the defendant.”); Eric L. Muller, Solving the 
Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amend-
ment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 144 (1996) (“[C]riminal verdicts are not just findings of 
historical fact, but expressions of an inescapably subjective consensus reached 
among jurors who bring discrete viewpoints and perspectives to their delibera-
tions.”). 
 174. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 570 n.242 (“Legis-
latures . . . fund appointed defense counsel at levels that require an enormous 
amount of selectivity—counsel can contest only a very small fraction of the 
cases on their dockets, and can investigate only a small fraction of the claims 
their clients might have . . . . The consequence is to steer criminal litigation 
away from the facts, and toward more cheaply raised constitutional claims. 
Those claims tend not to correlate with innocence; or, if they do, the correla-
tion may be perverse.”). 
 175. See Johnson, supra note 71, at 193 (“[T]he racial overlay to the crimi-
nal justice system in the United States strongly suggests that the criminal 
laws are unevenly enforced. Race-based law enforcement has plagued the na-
tion for centuries and continues to do so.” (citations omitted)). 
 176. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 167, at 7–16 (citing empirical re-
search showing racial and/or ethnic disparities at each of six prosecutorial dis-
cretion points); M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal 
Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences 7–16 (Program in Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 12-002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1985377 (demonstrating charging disparity in federal 
district court). 
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tion there is also the risk of bias,177 and indeed indications of 
implicit, or unconscious, bias, have been found in key criminal 
justice decisionmakers: police officers,178 judges,179 defense at-
torneys,180 prosecutors,181 and juries.182 Caseload pressures af-
fecting these decisionmakers increase the risk of arbitrari-
ness.183
Second, the label of “criminal conviction” fails to supply an 




 177. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 
 Both the 
law and those alleged to have violated it complicate the pur-
ported connection. With regard to the law, convictions can oc-
162, at 5 (“In a system so 
dominated by discretionary decisions, discrimination is easy.”). 
 178. See Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnici-
ty to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1317–18 (2002).  
 179. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect 
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196–97 (2009). 
 180. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Atti-
tudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1555 (2004). 
 181. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prose-
cutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 884 (2009) 
(“[E]ven after controlling for legally relevant factors, race and gender affect 
charging and sentencing decisions.”). 
 182. See Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The 
Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 207–08 
(2010). The case of presidential pardons is also worth considering. A recent 
study indicated that African Americans are four times less likely to succeed in 
their pardon applications than Whites. Linzer & LaFleur, supra note 169 (not-
ing that a Justice Department official was unable to offer an explanation).  
 183. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An 
Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
583, 601–02 (2005) (“Extreme docket pressure characterizes DAs’ offices . . . . 
Local police, on whom district attorneys must depend, also labor under severe 
resource constraints.”); Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 570 
n.242 (“[L]egislatures . . . fund appointed defense counsel at levels that require 
an enormous amount of selectivity—counsel can contest only a very small frac-
tion of the cases on their dockets, and can investigate only a small fraction of 
the claims their clients might have.”). 
 184. Unfairness, after all, is not a crime. See Yankah, supra note 127, at 
1037 (“[C]riminal punishment is an ill-conceived proxy for punishing charac-
ter.”). One Texas court appeared to acknowledge that at least some convictions 
may stem from something other than malignant character—even while hold-
ing fast to such a connection in other contexts. Loredo v. State, 47 S.W.3d 55, 
58 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (“While certainly not wanting to condone or trivialize 
the effects of petty theft, it must be noted that such theft is frequently the re-
sult of spur-of-the-moment impulses or compulsions or even of pranks or 
dares. It certainly does not require or evidence the kind of planning, the dis-
honesty, the moral turpitude, or the disdain for our laws and institutions in-
trinsic to bribery, perjury, and forgery, and even higher levels of theft.”). 
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cur in the absence of any culpable mental state,185 and in the 
absence of any understanding that the law is being broken.186 
As Doug Husak writes, “[it] is hard to believe that many of us 
have not committed countless state and federal offenses.”187 
With regard to those alleged to have violated the law, the prev-
alence of social disadvantage among those who are convicted 
complicates the notion that it is character flaws that are re-
sponsible for criminal convictions.188
Even with regard to felony convictions, the same types of 
objections exist. First, the distinction between felony and mis-
demeanor convictions is a less than solid basis on which to rest 
this civic exclusion. Far from having a fixed referent, the label 
of “felon” has been applied increasingly broadly,
 
189 as the num-
ber of felonies has expanded,190
 
 185. See Perez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (finding 
that felony driving while intoxicated does not require a culpable mental state); 
Jeffrey A. Meyer, Authentically Innocent: Juries and Federal Regulatory 
Crimes, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 137, 137 (2007) (“For a wide range of the most com-
monly charged federal crimes, judges routinely instruct juries to convict de-
fendants regardless of their moral culpability—that is, even if there is no proof 
or finding that the defendant knew she was doing something wrong.”). 
 and the number of people with 
 186. See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake 
of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 739–40 (2012) (suggest-
ing that mistake of law doctrine should be reconsidered in light of the fact that 
with over 300,000 ways of violating the federal criminal law one can no longer 
be presumed to know the law). 
 187. Husak, supra note 162, at 268; id. at 268–69 (adding that “relatively 
few of us have actually been punished,” and that “we have been spared 
through exercises of discretion”). 
 188. See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 336 (Erwin 
Chemerinsky et al. eds., 6th ed. 2008) (explaining that juror qualifications 
such as “no prior felony convictions” are “standards rather easily met by the 
middle-class but which easily ensnare the poor”); Richard Delgado, The 
Wretched of the Earth, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 (2011) (“[L]aw, alone 
among major disciplines, proceeds . . . as though two individuals raised under 
radically different circumstances have equal chances to conform their behavior 
to society’s dictates.”); Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal 
Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 371 (2004) [hereinafter Dolovich, Legit-
imate Punishment]; id. at 319 (explaining that an “unjust distribution of socie-
ty’s goods” means that “citizens will differ dramatically in terms of both the 
pressures and temptations they face to offend against others, and the econom-
ic and moral resources with which they are equipped to resist such pressures 
and temptations”). 
 189. See Kalt, supra note 7, at 101 (“[T]he fact remains that ostracism 
means something very different now than it did in the 1970s, when the pro-
portion of felons in the population was less than one-half of what it is today.”). 
 190. See Johnson, supra note 71, at 191 (mentioning the “dramatic expan-
sion of the crimes that constitute felonies”). 
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felony convictions has grown to more than twenty million.191 At 
common law, felonies were a narrow group of offenses,192 all 
punishable by death,193 and all deemed to be “inherently moral-
ly wrong.”194 Now, however, there are “numerous felonies, but 
not all are serious, or mala in se, or life-endangering.”195 In-
deed, Harvey Silverglate estimates that each of us unwittingly 
commits three felonies a day.196 The distinction between felony 
and misdemeanor now seems, as the Supreme Court has put it, 
“increasingly technical,”197 and may be detached from measures 
of relative threat,198 or of factual guilt.199 It can be one’s prior 
record, for example, rather than any difference in the instant 
offense, that makes that offense a felony rather than a misde-
meanor.200
 
 191. Love, supra note 
 The distinction is not only technical but also discre-
19. 
 192. See Elizabeth Kelly, State v. Fields: Felony Murder and Psychological 
Use of a Deadly Weapon, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1220 n.1 (1987) (“The common-
law felonies, other than murder, were rape, sodomy, robbery, burglary, arson, 
mayhem, and larceny.”). 
 193. James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A 
Study of the Forces That Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1429, 1445–46 (1994). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 1447. 
 196. L. Gordon Crovitz, You Commit Three Felonies a Day, WALL ST. J. 
Sept. 28, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574 
438900830760842.html. 
 197. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985) (“[W]hile in earlier times 
the gulf between the felonies and the minor offences was broad and deep, to-
day the distinction is minor and often arbitrary. Many crimes classified as 
misdemeanors, or nonexistent, at common law are now felonies. These chang-
es have . . . made the assumption that a ‘felon’ is more dangerous than a mis-
demeanant untenable. Indeed, numerous misdemeanors involve conduct more 
dangerous than many felonies.”); id. at 16 n.12 (“White collar crime, for exam-
ple, poses a less significant physical threat than, say, drunken driving.”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Ted Chiricos et al., The Labeling of Convicted Felons and Its Con-
sequences for Recidivism, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 547, 548 (2007) (“The state of Flor-
ida has a law [FLA. STAT. § 948.01 (2013)] that allows individuals who have 
been found guilty of a felony, either by a judge, jury, or plea, to literally avoid 
the label of convicted felon. Judges have the option of ‘withholding adjudica-
tion’ of guilt for convicted felons who are being sentenced to probation. The 
consequence of this unique labeling event is that offenders who are equivalent 
in terms of factual guilt can either be labeled a convicted felon or not.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Smith & Sarma, supra note 68, at 405 (“In Louisiana, posses-
sion of marijuana is a misdemeanor offense. However, if a person is arrested 
for marijuana possession, second offense, the district attorney possesses the 
discretion to choose whether to charge the crime again as a ‘first offense,’ re-
sulting only in a misdemeanor conviction, or the prosecutor can choose to 
charge the same possession as a marijuana ‘second offense’ . . . .”); see also 
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tionary, since the difference between a felony and a misde-
meanor conviction can rest on a decision about what to 
charge;201 or what to offer in return for a plea bargain or for co-
operation.202 The reality is thus quite different from the asser-
tion, made breezily by one court in upholding the state’s exclu-
sions, that “[t]hose who are convicted of felonies freely chose to 
commit felonies.”203
Second, the label of “felony conviction” fails to supply an 
adequate proxy for a character unfit for jury service. Felony 
convictions have expanded beyond the realm of mala in se of-
fenses, and can now be attached to mala prohibita;
 
204 some fel-
onies are strict liability offenses.205 Regimes of jury exclusion 
have not kept pace with these changes in the criminal law.206
Methods of determining juror fitness before the current re-
gime of statutory exclusions were flawed: the discretion enjoyed 




ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-111 (LexisNexis 2012) (determining which driving 
while intoxicated offenses constitute felonies based on prior record). 
 Yet, in the move to-
ward a purportedly objective standard the discretion and bias 
have not been shed. Rather, they persist, sprinkled throughout 
the criminal justice system, and undermine the validity of au-
tomatic exclusions based on criminal convictions. 
 201. See Smith & Sarma, supra note 68, at 405 (explaining that “second of-
fense” marijuana possession is a felony that carries a maximum of five years 
imprisonment).  
 202. See Montré D. Carodine, Keeping It Real: Reforming the “Untried Con-
viction” Impeachment Rule, 69 MD. L. REV. 501, 547 (2010) (“In the prosecu-
tor’s decision whether to charge and then offer a plea deal, the strength of the 
case against a defendant in reality might not factor at all.”). 
 203. State v. Crocker, 982 P.2d 45, 48 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).  
 204. See Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: 
Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 657 
(2006). 
 205. See, e.g., Perez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) 
(felony driving while intoxicated does not require a culpable mental state). 
 206. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1952) (“Histor-
ically, our substantive criminal law is based on a theory of punishing the [vi-
cious] will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing 
right and doing wrong, and choosing freely to do wrong.”). 
 207. See Kalt, supra note 7, at 178. 
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C. THE “PURITY” OF THE JURY 
The exclusion of those with criminal records is often justi-
fied as necessary to maintaining jury “purity.”208
[i]t cannot be said that [the ‘purity and efficiency’ guaranteed to the 
Texas jury system by the state constitution] is maintained by permit-
ting juries to be composed of thieves, robbers, murderers, kidnappers, 
perjurers, rapists, drug dealers and others convicted of felonies simp-
ly because they successfully completed their terms of probation.
 In the view of 
one court, for example:  
209
Another court criticized a Texas statute on the grounds that it 
“allow[ed] juries to be empaneled with persons who have been 
‘convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery or other high crimes,’ 
thereby destroying the jury’s purity.”
  
210
These invocations of purity rest, when they occur in Texas, 
on a misunderstanding. The misunderstanding concerns what 
the supposedly “pure” entity is. The Texas constitution has, 
since 1867, contained a provision that “[t]he right to trial by ju-
ry shall remain inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws 
as may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its pu-
rity and efficiency.”
 
211 Texas courts have differed about what 
the meaning of “its” is. As shown above, some lower courts have 
interpreted this provision as forbidding the service of those who 
would pollute the otherwise pure jury.212
The words “purity and efficiency” relate to the right to a trial by jury, 
not to the jury itself. The purity of the right is maintained by provid-
ing the right in all cases for all issues that the jury is required to de-
cide (assuming the right has not been waived).
 A judge on the Court 
of Criminal Appeals had to point out that “purity” refers not to 
jury composition, but rather to the right: 
213
 
 208. See, e.g., Firestone v. Freiling, 188 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1963) 
(“It is . . . the duty of a court to preserve the purity of trials by jury.”). 
 
 209. R.R.E. v. Glenn, 884 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex. App. 1994) (rejecting the 
argument that a state statute could constitutionally permit a judge to restore 
jury rights of those who have felony convictions and have been successful un-
der community supervision). 
 210. Perez v. State, 973 S.W.2d 759, 761–62 (Tex. App. 1998) (discussing 
statutory requirement that any motion to reverse a conviction because of a 
post-verdict discovery of a juror’s lack of qualification be accompanied by a 
“showing of significant harm by the service of the disqualified juror,” and stat-
ing that this “offensive” requirement “does not effect the constitution’s purpose 
to maintain the purity of the jury’s composition of qualified persons”). 
 211. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
 212. See, e.g., Perez, 973 S.W.2d at 762. 
 213. Perez v. State, 11 S.W.3d 218, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (Keller, J., 
concurring).  
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Yet other jurisdictions invoke “purity” also,214 as well as related 
concepts. Whether the word used is “taint,”215 “pollution,”216 or 
“incompetence,”217 the language adopted to justify jury exclu-
sion often suggests dehumanization, and a racial subtext.218 
The notion of the “purity of the jury,” for example, evokes the 
racialized vision of the “purity of the ballot box,”219
 
 214. See, e.g., Firestone v. Freiling, 188 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1963). 
 a frequent 
justification for jury exclusion’s closest cousin: disenfranchise-
 215. See JUROR COMPENSATION AND QUALIFICATION, supra note 49 (“A 
person who has been convicted of a felony might have a tainted view of the 
criminal justice system and sympathize with a criminal defendant.”). 
 216. See Amaya v. State, 220 S.W. 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920) (“[T]he 
object of the Legislature appears to be . . . the protection of society against the 
pollution of the jury system by committing its execution to persons whose 
moral status has been judicially established as criminal.”); Matthew Benja-
min, Possessing Pollution, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 733, 767 n.276 
(2007) (stating that “pollution anxieties have been exploited to justify . . . legal 
restrictions that continue to have profoundly inequitable consequences, includ-
ing felon disenfranchisement,” commonly justified on the basis of trying to 
preserve the “purity of the ballot box”). 
 217. Jury exclusion is frequently based on the idea of “incompetence.” Ten-
nessee’s statute is entitled “Incompetent Persons.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1-
102 (2013); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2013) (defining “competent ju-
ror”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-105(2) (2013) (“A person who has been con-
victed of a felony which has not been expunged is not competent to serve as a 
juror.”); James M. Binnall, A Felon Deliberates: Policy Implications of the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s Holding in People v. Miller, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 59, 68 (2010) (“While lawmakers once employed the ‘neo-contractarian’ 
justification for subjecting those with a felony criminal record to civic re-
strictions, the more contemporary view is that all felons are somehow incom-
petent and unable to fulfill the requisite duties of civic life.”). 
 218. For racial subtext of “incompetence,” see Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Race and 
the Victim: An Examination of Capital Sentencing and Guilt Attribution Stud-
ies, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 533, 534 (1998) (“Racial stereotypes about Blacks 
being less intelligent and less competent than non-Blacks constituted the sub-
text underlying much of the criticism of the [O.J. Simpson] verdict and subse-
quent cries for reform of the jury system.”); Lee, supra note 87, at 413 (men-
tioning “oft-unstated assumption” that “blacks are not necessarily granted a 
presumption of innocence, competence, or even complete humanity”). 
 219. See Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and 
the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Four-
teenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 312 (2004) (“Unfortunately, as the Su-
preme Court held in Hunter v. Underwood, Alabama’s felon disenfranchise-
ment provision was designed to maintain white supremacy; the ballot box 
purity was of the racial variety.”); Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: 
Citizenship, Criminality, and ‘The Purity of the Ballot Box’, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1300, 1313 (1989) (“The image [of the ‘purity of the ballot box’] suggests not 
only that former offenders are impure, but also that their impurity may be 
contagious. It reflects a belief that clear boundaries must be maintained be-
tween the attainted criminal and the virtuous citizenry, lest contamination 
occur.”). 
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ment. Both types of exclusion have served racially discrimina-
tory ends,220 and bring continuing racial disparity.221
Even if one were to put racial overtones aside, and consider 
the notion of a “pure” jury, such a goal seems illusory—and cer-
tainly not obtainable through exclusion of one portion of the cit-
izenry. Jury service is a messy business. Jurors are not angel-
ic;
  
222 juries are not sacrosanct.223 Rather, jurors are humans, 
and they misbehave.224 For example, the electronic age has giv-
en them boundless opportunities to Google or tweet their way 
into disgrace.225
 
 220. For disenfranchisement, see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 639 (1993) 
(noting that “‘good character’ provisos were devised to deprive black voters of 
the franchise”); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227, 229 (1985) (holding 
that Alabama constitutional provision limiting the franchise based on certain 
convictions “was enacted with the intent of disenfranchising blacks,” and vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 
153 (1965) (finding that provisions of the Louisiana Constitution and statutes 
limiting the franchise violated constitutional protection against discrimination 
in voting). For jury service, see Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: 
Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory 
Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 116 (1990) (“During the era of slavery in 
this country, blacks were viewed as intellectually and morally inferior to 
whites, and incapable of rendering judgments against them.”); Grant H. Mor-
ris, The Greatest Legal Movie of All Time: Proclaiming the Real Winner, 47 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533, 538–39 (2010) (“Jim Crow laws were . . . used to dis-
courage African Americans from registering to vote. Because jurors were se-
lected from voter registration lists, Jim Crow laws prevented African Ameri-
cans from serving on juries.”). 
 In addition, study after study indicates that ju-
 221. For voting, see Tanya Dugree-Pearson, Disenfranchisement—A Race 
Neutral Punishment for Felony Offenders or a Way to Diminish the Minority 
Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 359, 375–77 (2002). For jury service, see 
supra Part II.A. 
 222. United States v. Ippolito, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 1998) 
(“Neither the government nor the defendant is entitled as a matter of right to 
an angelic and perfectly discerning jury . . . .”). 
 223. See James M. Binnall, Convicts in Court: Felonious Lawyers Make a 
Case for Including Convicted Felons in the Jury Pool, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1379, 
1408–09 (2010) (“[W]hile stopping well short of conceding that the jury system 
is an ineffective method of administering justice, one can conservatively dis-
miss the notion that the jury is the type of sacrosanct institution many felon 
jury exclusion proponents claim necessitates the outright eviction of those who 
have perhaps committed but one legal indiscretion.”). 
 224. See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Mayor of Balt., 670 A.2d 986, 
1001 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (“To be qualified as a juror, one need not have 
lived a blameless life, nor must a juror be ‘good.’”). 
 225. See Amanda McGee, Note, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 301–02 (2010); Suzi Parker, Arkansas Death Row 
Inmate Gets New Trial Because of Tweets, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www 
.reuters.com/article/2011/12/08/us-crime-twitter-arkansas-idUSTRE7B72C220 
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rors assume guilt,226 often in racialized ways,227 and put unjusti-
fied stock in the credibility of governmental employees.228 Per-
haps the best that can be hoped is that if enough different bias-
es and backgrounds are thrown together, the biases of the 
various jurors will “cancel each other out,”229 and that diversity 
will “beget[] impartiality.”230 Whereas members of one legisla-
ture speculated that the view of the criminal justice system 
held by someone who has been through it might be “tainted,”231
 
111208 (reporting that juror tweets were responsible for new murder trial); 
John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html?_r=0 (re-
porting that jurors violated judicial instructions not to conduct independent 
research).  
 
it might, rather, be a necessary shade in a spectrum of views. 
The pureness of the vision of the jury is hampered, rather than 
enhanced, by the exclusion of one portion of human experience, 
and the concomitant insistence on ignorance. 
 226. Gertner, supra note 99, at 931 (“Studies regularly suggest that juries 
believe that because someone is accused, they are likely to be guilty.”); see, 
e.g., Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant and 
the Presumption of Innocence: In the Hands of Real Jurors, Is Either of Them 
Safe?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 237, 248–49 (2006). 
 227. See, e.g., Levinson et al., supra note 182, at 190 (demonstrating that 
mock jurors “held strong associations between Black and Guilty, relative to 
White and Guilty, and [that] implicit associations predicted the way mock ju-
rors evaluated ambiguous evidence”). 
 228. See supra Part II.B (discussing how jurors assume prosecutors and 
police act with integrity even though evidence shows this is not always true). 
 229. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 754–55 (Cal. 1978) (“The rationale of 
these [Supreme Court cross-section cases], often unstated, is that in our heter-
ogeneous society jurors will inevitably belong to diverse and often overlapping 
groups defined by race, religion, ethnic or national origin, sex, age, education, 
occupation, economic condition, place of residence, and political affiliation; 
that it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be devoid of opinions, preconceptions, 
or even deep-rooted biases derived from their life experiences in such groups; 
and hence that the only practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to 
encourage the representation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that 
the respective biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, 
will tend to cancel each other out.”). Juror education on the topic of bias may 
also be effective. See, e.g., Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and 
Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 868–69 (2012) [here-
inafter Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury]. 
 230. State v. LaMere, 2 P.3d 204, 219 (Mont. 2000) (“American jurispru-
dence [believes] that a jury constituted of individuals with diverse perspec-
tives, coming from the various classes of society, is greater than the sum of its 
respective parts and can better arrive at a common sense judgment about a set 
of facts than can any individual . . . . In short, it is believed that diversity be-
gets impartiality.”). 
 231. See JUROR COMPENSATION AND QUALIFICATION, supra note 49. 
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D. EMBITTERMENT AGAINST THE SYSTEM 
Another common justification for the exclusion of those 
with criminal records from jury service is that those who have 
been through the system can be assumed to be so embittered by 
it that they cannot be relied upon to be fair: that voir dire or no 
voir dire, oath or no oath, instructions or no instructions, they 
would be too hostile to the state. Thus, for example, one court 
noted that: 
The Legislature could reasonably determine that a person who has 
suffered the most severe form of condemnation that can be inflicted 
by the state—a conviction of felony and punishment therefor—might 
well harbor a continuing resentment against “‘the system”‘ that pun-
ished him and an equally unthinking bias in favor of the defendant on 
trial, who is seen as a fellow underdog caught in its toils.232
Another state based its exclusion statute on the notion that “[a] 
person who has been convicted of a felony might have a tainted 
view of the criminal justice system and sympathize with a crim-
inal defendant,” and that “[s]uch a situation is blatantly unfair 
to the prosecution and the crime victim.”
  
233
The concern about blatant unfairness is undermined by the 
fact that courts offer no more support for this justification than 
they do for the others. In one recent case, the Michigan Su-
preme Court cited a few articles in support of its assertion that 
“[h]aving been previously convicted of similar offenses, the ju-
ror, if anything, likely would have been sympathetic towards 
defendant.”
 
234 One of those articles describes such a rationale as 
a “gross” and “needless” overgeneralization;235 another de-
scribes it as a rationale “without foundation.”236
 
 232. Rubio v. Super. Ct., 593 P.2d 595, 600 (Cal. 1979) (en banc). 
 The implica-
tions and consequences of the “embitterment” rationale are too 
important to allow the rationale to go uninvestigated. If the as-
sumption of “embitterment” is false, then the grave conse-
quence of civic exclusion should not be allowed to rest on it. If 
the assumption is true, a deeper response than exclusion of ju-
rors is needed. Investigation is therefore required into whether 
 233. JUROR COMPENSATION AND QUALIFICATION, supra note 49. 
 234. People v. Miller, 759 N.W.2d 850, 860 & n.19 (Mich. 2008). 
 235. Kalt, supra note 7. 
 236. See Note, A Jury of One’s Peers: Virginia’s Restoration of Rights Pro-
cess and Its Disproportionate Effect on the African American Community, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2109, 2137 (2005) (“Disallowing convicted felons to serve 
as jury members may be unnecessary, as any jury member who is biased may 
be struck for cause by the judge or by use of a peremptory strike.”). 
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the criminal justice system can indeed be assumed to embitter 
beyond fairness those who pass through it. 
There are reasons why the assumption that a criminal 
conviction leads to embitterment against the state might be 
false.237 After all, the assumption appears to ignore the fact that 
many defendants frequently have more complex relationships 
than purely oppositional ones with the state: many will have 
cooperated with the state,238 most will have reached a bargain 
with the state,239 and a great many will have been alleged vic-
tims of criminal offenses and thus potentially championed by 
the state.240
On the other hand, there are a host of reasons why the as-
sumption might be accurate. The criminal justice system is suf-
fused with disparities,
 
241 is vulnerable to error,242 and is often 
detached from community notions of justice.243
 
 237. One federal judge proposed two hypotheses to explain why a juror 
with a felony conviction might be biased in favor of a guilty verdict. United 
States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J., dissenting in 
part, concurring in part). First, the juror “may have developed a callous cyni-
cism about protestations of innocence, having no doubt heard many such la-
ments while incarcerated.” Id. Second, the juror’s “desire to show others—and 
himself—that he is now a good citizen might lead him to display an excess of 
rectitude, both in his deliberations and in his vote.” Id. 
 Potential causes 
 238. See Bibas, supra note 171, at 299 (“[S]ubstantial-assistance depar-
tures . . . occur in more than one-sixth of all [federal] sentences.”). 
 239. See Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT., http://bjs.gov/fjsrc/ (follow “Offenders sentenced: tables” hyperlink: then 
select year “2009”; then select “Case disposition”; then select “All values”; then 
select “Frequencies” and “Percents”; then select “HTML”) (showing that rough-
ly 96% of those sentenced resolved their cases by guilty plea). 
 240. Bernard E. Harcourt, An Institutionalization Effect: The Impact of 
Mental Hospitalization and Imprisonment on Homicide in the United States, 
1934–2001, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 44 (2011). 
 241. See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias 
and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 322 (2013) [hereinafter 
Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration] (“[A]s mass incarceration stays with 
us, its glaring racial disparities continue . . . .”); Roberts, Cost of Mass Incar-
ceration, supra note 130, at 1295 (“Residents have good reason to distrust a 
criminal justice system that has treated them with disrespect, bias, and bru-
tality.”); Michael Rocque, Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System 
and Perceptions of Legitimacy, 1 RACE & JUST. 292, 293 (2011) (advancing a 
theoretical linkage between racial disparity in criminal justice and an individ-
ual’s perception of the legitimacy of the law). 
 242. See GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 102, at 3. 
 243. See Fagan, supra note 164, at 123 (“Surveys of public opinion over four 
decades consistently show that Americans have little confidence in the fair-
ness or effectiveness of the criminal justice system and criminal law more gen-
erally.”); Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: 
Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1107 (2010) (“One 
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of embitterment exist throughout the stages of a criminal pro-
ceeding. With regard to policing, the methods used may pro-
voke resentment.244 With regard to the court system, having a 
voice in the system is a crucial aspect of perceived fairness of 
that system,245 and yet a fear of impeachment and sentencing 
enhancement often deters defendants from making their voice 
heard on the witness stand.246 With regard to sentencing, prison 
terms are often nasty, brutish, and long.247 Conditions of con-
finement are frequently “gratuitous[ly] inhumane,”248
 
may well ask how well current American criminal law matches the communi-
ty’s intuitions of justice. The short answer is: not well. Modern crime-control 
programs, such as three strikes, high drug-offense penalties, adult prosecution 
of juveniles, narrowing the insanity defense, strict liability offenses, and the 
felony-murder rule, all distribute criminal liability and punishment in ways 
that seriously conflict with lay persons’ intuitions of justice.”). 
 and leave 
 244. See Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: 
Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 335, 351 (2011) (“[I]ntensive law enforcement and a readiness 
to arrest for low-level offenses is far more likely to arouse resentment, weaken 
police legitimacy, and undermine voluntary compliance with the law.”). 
 245. See Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Au-
thorities: The Role of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 629, 646 (1989) [hereinafter Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance] 
(“[S]tudies of the meaning of fair procedure suggest that defendants are very 
interested in having the opportunity to present their views to decision makers 
prior to having decisions made about their case.”). 
 246. For fear of impeachment, see John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the 
Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons from the Wrongfully Con-
victed, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 477 (2008) (explaining that defense 
counsel, in a sample of cases where defendants were convicted despite factual 
innocence, gave fear of impeachment by prior conviction as the primary reason 
that their clients did not take the stand). For fear of sentencing enhancement, 
see Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal 
Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 877–78 
(2008).  
 247. See Dolovich, Exclusion and Control, supra note 131, at 265 (noting 
that sentences are often “grossly disproportionate to the offense”); Stephen F. 
Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 128 (2009) (explain-
ing that proportionality of punishment is a concern that many prosecutors 
“routinely ignore”). I borrow the phrase from Thomas Hobbes. THOMAS 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck, ed., Cambridge University Press rev. 
student ed. 1996) (1651) (“[A]nd the life of man . . . nasty, brutish, and short.”). 
 248. Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment, supra note 188, at 437 (“[C]onsider, 
in light of the state’s obligation to avoid gratuitous inhumane punishments, 
the conditions of confinement facing inmates at prisons and jails across the 
country, which strongly suggest that this requirement is routinely being vio-
lated. The widespread incidence of rape and sexual assault in prisons and jails 
and the ongoing threat of such abuse, which is a permanent aspect of incar-
ceration at many prisons, would alone serve to prove the point.”); see also id. 
at 439 (describing prison overcrowding that not only exacerbates the risk of 
sexual and other violence and coercion but also “depriv[es] inmates of the min-
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enduring effects.249 To say that long and tedious periods of in-
carceration are tantamount to “warehousing” is to be overly 
generous: warehouses are, at least, supposed to keep items in a 
stable condition.250 Human beings, however, are not items; they 
decline.251
If the assumption is well-founded, exclusion from jury ser-
vice as a result is an inapt response. It is an amputation of one 
portion of the body politic in lieu of treatment, or even diagno-
sis, or even investigation, of the underlying condition. Automat-
ic, cost-free exclusions on the basis of assumed embitterment 
permit the state to avoid the consequences of something poten-
tially very wrong with the state. 
 
The criminal justice system is not supposed to embitter 
those who pass through it to such an extent that they cannot be 
fair. Theories of punishment do not advocate such an arrange-
ment,252
 
imum physical space humans need to preserve a sense of self”); Eva S. Nilsen, 
Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Con-
stitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 113 (2007) (“American pun-
ishment has become degrading, indecent, and undeservedly harsher despite a 
Constitution designed to protect people from infliction of excessive punishment 
. . . . The indecency of punishment is compounded when individuals are sen-
tenced to live in institutions where they suffer substantial physical and psy-
chological harm.”). 
 and theories of procedural justice run directly counter 
 249. See Craig Haney, Counting Casualties in the War on Prisoners, 43 
U.S.F. L. REV. 87, 107 (2008) (“[P]eople who are subjected to extreme forms of 
imprisonment can be psychologically harmed—sometimes irreparably so—by 
the experience. Moreover, most prisoners cannot leave the psychic scars of 
these experiences miraculously behind them upon release, just as most people 
cannot simply choose to set aside the aftereffects of damaging, traumatic 
events.”). 
 250. See Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
17, 72–73 (2003) (“If not provided with mental stimulation and human interac-
tion, [humans] tend to deteriorate; if not given an opportunity to practice ac-
quired skills, those skills that they possess become impaired, thereby reducing 
the person’s economic value to himself and to society. Thus, even a good ware-
house would provide prisoners with many of the programmatic features we 
identify as rehabilitative, and a good prison would certainly include those fea-
tures.”). 
 251. See id. at 72. 
 252. Note that one of the stated requisites of a federal sentence is “to pro-
mote respect for the law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012); see also Stephanos 
Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 342 
(2007) (“The point of punishment is not to ostracize criminals into a perma-
nent underclass, embittered and tempted to revictimize a society that shuns 
them.”). Many scholars note the apparent abandonment of traditional theories 
of punishment in a penal system that represents a “war on prisoners.” See, 
e.g., Craig Haney, Politicizing Crime and Punishment: Redefining “Justice” to 
Fight the “War on Prisoners”, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 373, 376 (2012); Robert Weis-
Roberts_MLR  
2013] CASUAL OSTRACISM 633 
 
to the unquestioning acceptance of the “embitterment” ra-
tionale.253 For example, Tom Tyler and his colleagues’ work 
demonstrates that those who have been through the criminal 
justice system—even those who have incurred felony convic-
tions254—do not necessarily view the criminal justice system as 
unfair,255 and that this is a precious thing, since perceived fair-
ness helps bring about compliance with legal regimes.256 The 
functioning of the criminal justice system relies on acceptance 
from those affected by it; it cannot run on embitterment.257
 
berg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 
1207 (2012) (“[O]ur standard litany of punishment theories is simply irrele-
vant to the reality we confront . . . . It is a system that, deliberately or not, re-
inforces the economics and demographics of diminished social status, and does 
so in reckless disregard of its measurable consequences.”); see also Dolovich, 
Exclusion and Control, supra note 
 
131, at 261 (“[T]he more familiar way[] of 
construing the penal system [is] as the means to achieve retribution or to en-
sure public safety by deterring or otherwise preventing the commission of 
crime. But a close look at the way the system actually operates makes clear 
the poor fit between these more conventional explanations and the realities of 
American penal practice.”). 
 253. See Schulhofer et al., supra note 244, at 345–46 (“The procedural jus-
tice concept captures the fairness of the process used to make and apply rules 
and the quality of the personal treatment people receive from authorities.”). 
 254. Indeed, the more serious the case, the more study participants placed 
weight on perceived procedural fairness in evaluating their experiences. Tyler 
et al., Maintaining Allegiance, supra note 245, at 641 n.6. 
 255. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING 
PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 53 (2002) (noting that in 
one survey over 70% of participants “felt that the authorities with whom they 
dealt used fair procedures and that they treated people fairly”); Jonathan D. 
Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483, 
494 (1988) (finding that procedural justice made a “significant and independ-
ent contribution” to three separate measures of litigant satisfaction, even for 
litigants facing felony charges and punitive outcomes); Tom R. Tyler, The Psy-
chology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 837 (1989) (finding that a sense of fair treatment 
rather than outcome is a better predictor of satisfaction with treatment by le-
gal authorities); Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance, supra note 245, at 645 
(“[T]he government can influence the impact of negative outcomes on alle-
giance by delivering those outcomes through procedures that citizens will view 
as fair.”). 
 256. See Schulhofer et al., supra note 244, at 338; Tyler et al., Maintaining 
Allegiance, supra note 245, at 631 (viewing the law as a “positive and benevo-
lent force that is fairly and equally applied across citizens” increases behav-
ioral obedience to the law); id. at 645 (“[T]he manner in which citizens are 
treated is a key factor in the impact of their experiences on views about law 
and government.”). 
 257. Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1940, 1995–96 (2010) (“[E]ffective operation of the criminal justice system de-
pends upon the cooperation, or at least the acquiescence, of those involved in 
it—offenders, judges, jurors, witnesses, prosecutors, police, and others. To the 
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Thus, if there is concern about the criminal justice system caus-
ing embitterment, the answer is not automatic exclusion, but 
careful investigation; if necessary, as discussed in the next 
Part, incentives should be adjusted so that such investigation is 
more likely to occur. 
IV.  THE PROPOSAL   
This Part puts forth a proposal in response to two conclu-
sions: first, that the justifications given for automatic exclu-
sions do not outweigh the harms that these exclusions cause, 
and second, that the state should not be permitted to invoke 
the “embittered against the state” assumption without litiga-
tion cost. It then explains the proposal’s scholarly context, be-
fore discussing necessary corollaries, and possible objections, to 
the proposal. 
This Article’s proposal is that automatic exclusions based 
solely on a potential juror’s criminal record—whether effected 
through mailing of summonses only to those on the voting rolls, 
statutory disqualifications, or automatic granting of challenges 
for cause—should be abandoned. Discretionary granting of 
challenges for cause where jurors have a demonstrated bias 
should remain available. Where there is no demonstrated bias, 
the peremptory challenge should be the only means by which 
attorneys can remove jurors with criminal convictions. This 
combination of discretionary challenges for cause and peremp-
tory challenges has been deemed a sufficient screening mecha-
nism in the case of complaining witnesses,258
 
extent that people see the system as unjust—as in conflict with their intui-
tions about justice—acquiescence and cooperation are likely to fade and be re-
placed with subversion and resistance.”). 
 and in the case of 
 258. In the case of Texas, for example, where a misdemeanor theft convic-
tion or any felony conviction mean exclusion for life, as do pending charges for 
the same offenses, parallel exclusions have been rejected for complaining wit-
nesses. See Rubio v. Super. Ct., 593 P.2d 595, 609 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) 
(Tobriner, J., dissenting) (“[J]ust as pro-defendant bias is presumed of ex-
felons by the exclusionary scheme, the converse corollary presumption of pro-
prosecution bias on the part of victims of crimes would dictate their automatic 
exclusion as well. I fail to see how the state can reasonably differentiate be-
tween these groups in its effort to assure jury impartiality.”); Janecka v. State, 
739 S.W.2d 813, 834–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (rejecting the constitutional 
claim that automatic exclusion of those under indictment for a theft or any fel-
ony should be paired with an automatic exclusion of those who are complain-
ing witnesses in pending cases, and noting that where those in the latter 
group can be shown not to be impartial, they “can of course be excluded for 
cause”). 
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law enforcement.259 It has been deemed a sufficient screening 
mechanism in the case of those who, while lacking a criminal 
record, share the same character traits used to justify these au-
tomatic exclusions: unreliability, lack of integrity, dishonesty, 
bias, and so on.260 In the absence of any reliable data to the con-
trary, it should be deemed a sufficient screening mechanism in 
the case of those with criminal convictions. In addition, this 
proposal would add a litigation cost to those exclusions that are 
made on the basis of an assumed embitterment against the 
state, since the party that invokes this justification most of-
ten—the prosecution261—would use up one of a finite number of 
peremptory challenges each time it did so.262 If those who pass 
through the criminal justice system are embittered against the 
state, this proposal aims to incentivize the prosecution to re-
flect upon its role in a system assumed to be embittering, and 
upon its ability to investigate and address possible causes of 
embitterment. Thus, this proposal joins recent scholarly pro-
posals that have suggested adjustments to prosecutorial incen-
tives elsewhere in the criminal justice system. It asserts, as do 
those other recent proposals, that in the criminal justice system 
as currently configured there are few incentives for the state to 
address the status quo hinted at in the “embitterment” ra-
tionale: a system so damaging as to preclude fair judgment by 
its alumni.263
 
 259. See State v. Ballard, 747 So. 2d 1077, 1080 (La. 1999) (rejecting auto-
matic disqualification of law enforcement officers in favor of discretionary rul-
ing on cause challenge, and emphasizing the deference owed to the trial judge, 
“who is in the most favorable position to determine whether a prospective ju-
ror can serve impartially”). 
 
 260. As Dolovich puts it, we are all “human beings, with all the qualities of 
impulsiveness, bad judgment, proneness to error, and other limitations this 
status entails.” Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment, supra note 188, at 319; id. at 
368 (“[H]uman beings are not infallible. We make mistakes. We make bad 
judgments. We act on impulse, and in haste. And often, when we do so, we do 
wrong to others.”). 
 261. See, e.g., Lance Salyers, Note, Invaluable Tool v. Unfair Use of Private 
Information: Examining Prosecutors’ Use of Jurors’ Criminal History Records 
in Voir Dire, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1079, 1088 (1999) (explaining that Vir-
ginia prosecutors argued they should be able to use prospective jurors’ crimi-
nal history records as a means of detecting bias against the state (citation 
omitted)). 
 262. For an exploration of the influence of litigation costs on prosecutorial 
behavior, see Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and 
Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 646–47 (1972).  
 263. See Smith & Sarma, supra note 68, at 406 (“[W]ith a felony record, ex-
offenders cannot participate to effectuate change by sitting in judgment of an-
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Few incentives exist at any level of government to address 
such a status quo.264 There are few incentives at the legislative 
level, because neither those with criminal convictions,265 nor 
those who have been in prison,266 nor excluded jurors,267 have a 
powerful lobbying voice,268 let alone those who may fall into all 
three groups.269 What power they may once have had, in the 
form of the vote, may be gone.270
 
other defendant on a criminal jury. Discrimination by design has contributed 
to self-sustaining structural inequality.”). 
 There are also few incentives 
at the prosecutorial level, due to a lack of prosecutorial ac-
 264. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 717 (1996) (“[N]o one is currently held accountable for 
the successes or failures of the criminal justice system.”). 
 265. See Demleitner, supra note 119, at 158–59. 
 266. See Roberts, Cost of Mass Incarceration, supra note 130, at 1292 
(“Neighborhoods with large percentages of current and former inmates lack 
the political clout to influence policies and demand services.”); id. at 1295 
(“The critical insight from sociological theory is that prison policy destroys the 
social networks and resources necessary for communities to have a say in the 
political process and to organize local institutions to contest unjust policies. 
This concrete interference with political capacity creates and reinforces social 
norms that question the effectiveness of collective efforts to produce social 
change. Mass imprisonment impairs community structures and norms that 
would channel resistance to systemic injustice in productive directions.”). 
 267. Leipold, supra note 18, at 987. 
 268. See Rubin, supra note 250, at 59 (“Ever since the first George Bush 
struck a devastating political blow to his opponent with the Willie Horton 
case, elected politicians have been terrified to recommend anything less than 
increased severity for criminals.”). 
 269. See Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 17, at 1490 (“The democratic de-
cisional process that creates criminal laws, mandatory minimum sentences, 
sentencing guidelines, felon disenfranchisement laws, and registration re-
quirements—in other words, all the punishments and burdens imposed on 
criminal defendants—takes place without hearing from defendants who are in 
the process of being subjected to those very laws. Once convicted and incarcer-
ated, defendants continue their exclusion from the public debate. Their silence 
begins in prison, and continues upon release, not least because of felony disen-
franchisement laws and defendants’ inability to hold public office. Defendants 
do not even have good proxy speakers: Their actual representatives—their at-
torneys—are constrained by the exigencies of litigation and sworn to secrecy. 
Moreover, there are very few interest groups who speak for defendants within 
the political process. Since First Amendment self-governance theory holds that 
the political process derives its legitimacy from the opportunity for expressive 
participation, defendants’ lack of parliamentary floor time renders their 
treatment by the criminal system deeply suspect.”). 
 270. See Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration, supra note 241, at 314 
(“With the exception of white collar defendants facing certain regulatory and 
corporate crimes, generally most criminal defendants are dispersed, disor-
ganized, poor, and in many instances, barred from voting. . . . Other groups 
that may share an interest in criminal defendants’ rights are similarly power-
less, particularly as compared to law enforcement.”). 
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countability,271 the dominance of the pressure to convict,272 and 
the externalization of many of the costs of prosecution.273 In-
deed, prosecutorial incentives tend to point toward harshness 
of the consequences of conviction, so that bargaining leverage 
may be maximized.274
Recent scholarly proposals have highlighted various com-
ponents of the criminal justice system in which prosecutorial 
incentives might be altered with the aim of bringing about re-
form, or at least awareness.
  
275 Thus, Robert Smith and Justin 
Levinson have proposed that prosecutors could be encouraged, 
“perhaps with housing or tax incentives,”276 “to live in neigh-
borhoods “disproportionately impacted by the charging deci-
sions made by the district attorney’s office.”277
 
 271. Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1987) (“[F]ew operate in a vacuum 
so devoid of externally enforceable constraints.”). 
 Adam 
Gershowitz has urged that state officials send monthly bulle-
 272. See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s 
Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2091 (2010) (“[C]onvictions are the lodestar 
by which prosecutors tend to be judged.”).  
 273. See Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. 
L. REV. 69, 105 (2011) (pointing out that prosecutors externalize, and thus fail 
to take into account, the costs of incarceration and public defense, and propos-
ing that prosecutors be required to reveal to voters the costs that they are in-
curring or anticipate incurring, so that the costs can be internalized and can 
shape decisions about whether to charge, what to charge, and what sentences 
to recommend); Misner, supra note 264, at 719 (“The current flaw in the evolv-
ing power of the prosecutor is the failure to force her to face the full cost of 
prosecutorial decisions.”); id. at 720 (explaining that because incarceration 
driven by local prosecutors is paid for by the state, “the prosecutor has little 
incentive to create prosecutorial guidelines, to become an active participant in 
crime prevention programs, or to find less costly means of punishment”). 
 274. See Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration, supra note 241, at 312 
(“[N]ot only do [prosecutors] have an interest in longer sentences and manda-
tory punishments, they also have an interest in opposing corrections reforms 
that make the conditions of confinement more relaxed or that result in earlier 
release times. Anything that makes the threat of a sentence after trial less se-
vere limits their bargaining power to some extent.”).  
 275. See Gold, supra note 273, at 73 (outlining a proposal to ensure that 
prosecutors consider “previously overlooked costs” created by prosecutorial de-
cisions). 
 276. Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial 
Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 
826 (2012). 
 277. Id. Similarly, Eric Miller argues that “former felons” should be includ-
ed in the grand jury, since “[l]ocalism and community participation may be 
even more beneficial if . . . those communities that feel threatened by drug pol-
icy are given the means of resisting and redirecting it.” Eric J. Miller, Drugs, 
Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 457 n.244 (2009). 
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tins to prosecutors, detailing state incarceration rates and pris-
on overcrowding, in the hope that they bear this information in 
mind when they choose plea offers.278 Robert Misner has sug-
gested that county prosecutors, who drive incarceration in state 
prisons, and yet do not have to pay for it, should be allocated an 
imprisonment budget, and should be billed if they splurge be-
yond it.279
Thus, scholars are asking how one might force open eyes 
that currently are allowed to remain shut,
  
280 and how one might 
bring to bear on a costly system some of the costs that it is pro-
ducing.281 They seek ways in which prosecutors might be moved 
from their comfort zones in terms of neighborhood, or in terms 
of freedom to resolve cases through imprisonment. They seek 
ways to end what Robert Weisberg calls the “reckless disregard 
of [the] measurable consequences” of the penal system.282
Having laid out the proposal and its scholarly context, this 
Part now addresses some of the corollaries that it would re-
quire, and some of the objections that it might inspire. 
 
A. THE NEED TO POLICE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
The first corollary relates to the proposal that attorneys 
wanting to challenge people with criminal records would have 
to do so in the peremptory phase, absent a showing of individu-
 
 278. Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Impris-
onment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 65 (2008). The proposal is based on a 
sense that prosecutors are insufficiently informed of, or constrained by, the 
resource deficiency in the rest of the criminal justice system. Id. at 49. 
 279. See Misner, supra note 264, at 720 (stating that the “thrust of [his] 
article is to attempt to find a mechanism for tying the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion to the availability of prison resources”). 
 280. See Gershowitz, supra note 278, at 49 (“On a day to day basis, most 
prosecutors are probably not cognizant of the lack of resources held by the rest 
of the criminal justice system. It is safe to assume that when prosecutors walk 
into court, they do not ask themselves whether there is sufficient funding to 
provide lawyers for all indicted defendants or whether there are enough prison 
or jail beds for everyone who will be convicted.”); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson 
Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475, 506 
(1998) (“If a case cannot stand examination by twelve jurors who fairly repre-
sent the community, it should fail. . . . And if race relations are so bad in a ju-
risdiction that adherence to [a set of ethical standards proposed by Professor 
Johnson in the Batson context] produces more than a few wrongful acquittals, 
it is time for everyone to know about it.”). 
 281. See Gold, supra note 273, at 105. 
 282. Weisberg, supra note 252, at 1207; id. at 1218 (“The incarcerated are 
invisible and therefore we do not observe the powerful engine of future eco-
nomic misery [that prison] operates.”). 
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al bias. If exclusions are to be funneled into the peremptory 
phase, it is particularly important to police the use of criminal 
convictions as a pretext for purposeful discrimination at that 
stage. The peremptory phase is already widely viewed, despite 
the Batson protections, as a hotbed of purposeful discrimina-
tion masked by ostensibly “race-neutral” reasons for challeng-
es.283 Particular concern centers on the fact that connection to 
the criminal justice system is one of the primary justifications 
that prosecutors give in response to Batson claims alleging ra-
cial or ethnic discrimination.284 Thus, the use of peremptory 
challenges must be more closely policed, in order to minimize 
the risk that they are used to effect purposeful racial or ethnic 
discrimination. This increase in policing needs to occur regard-
less of whether any changes are made to existing jury selection 
procedures.285
B. THE NEED TO MAKE JURY SERVICE ACCESSIBLE 
 
The second corollary of this proposal is that increased ef-
forts need to be made to ensure that jury service is accessible to 
all. Whatever expressive benefit may come from the lifting of 
exclusions, its practical benefit would be limited if jury service 
remains untenable for those at the sizeable intersection be-
tween criminal convictions and low socioeconomic status.286 
Thus, states must guarantee adequate stipends,287 dependent 
care,288 and job protection.289
 
 283. See Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury, supra note 
 Like the previous corollary, this 
reform needs to occur regardless of whether any changes are 
made to existing jury selection procedures.  
229, at 843. 
 284. See Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors, supra note 12, at 1375. 
 285. See Price, supra note 66, at 85 (referring, in the Batson context, to the 
“miniscule amount of time spent reviewing constitutional issues in lower 
courts”). 
 286. See Smyth, Jr., supra note 67, at 43 (“The disparate impact of the 
criminal justice system on communities of poverty and of color is well docu-
mented and undeniable.”). 
 287. See Amar, supra note 112, at 1184–85 (“To decline to compensate citi-
zens for their sacrifice—or to pay them $5 per day as is done in many Califor-
nia courts—is in effect to impose a functionally regressive poll tax that penal-
izes the working poor who want to serve and vote on juries, but who cannot 
afford the loss of a week’s pay.”). 
 288. See Mary Rose, A Voir Dire of Voir Dire: Listening to Jurors’ Views 
Regarding the Peremptory Challenge, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1061, 1071 (2003). 
 289. See David V. Wilson II, American Bar Association Principles for Juries 
and Jury Trials, HOUS. LAW., Sept./Oct. 2005, at 48 (describing American Bar 
Association principles aimed at job protection for jurors). 
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C. WHERE LEVERAGE SHOULD BE APPLIED 
One objection that might be raised to this proposal is that 
it exacts a cost only on the prosecution, in an effort to stir in-
vestigation of wrongs that may have occurred in any one of the 
three branches of government, in any one or more jurisdictions, 
state or federal. Thus, it may be argued that leverage is being 
applied bluntly, and possibly in the wrong place.  
One response is that proponents of automatic exclusions 
also engage in treatment of “the state” as a monolithic entity; 
according to the “embitterment” justification, someone who has 
been through the criminal justice system can be assumed, 
whatever the particular geographic or institutional source of 
his or her hardship, to have a blind resentment of the prosecu-
tion being carried out in the particular jurisdiction where the 
jury has been summoned—even though that person is unlikely 
ever to have been a defendant in a jury trial anywhere.290
A deeper response is that it is not unrealistic to think that 
pressure on prosecutors could lead to results from police and 
legislatures, given the power dynamics within the criminal jus-
tice system. Prosecutors wield enormous power in the system 
as currently configured.
 
291 They are “the criminal justice sys-
tem’s real lawmakers,”292 and hold powerful roles in relation to 
police and legislators.293
 
 290. Of the 81,372 defendants in federal criminal court who reached adju-
dication in 2009, 78,283 pled guilty; 2798, or 3.4%, faced a jury trial. Federal 
Criminal Case Processing Statistics, supra note 
 In some instances, they provide train-
239, available at http://bjs.ojp 
.usdoj.gov/fjsrc (follow “Offenders sentenced: tables” hyperlink; then select 
year “2009”; then select “Case disposition”; then select “All values”; then select 
“Frequencies” and “Percents”; then select “HTML”). 
 291. See Price, supra note 66, at 85 (describing prosecutors, in the context 
of the death penalty, as “the street-level agents of the state”). 
 292. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 506–07 (“Anyone who 
reads criminal codes in search of a picture of what conduct leads to a prison 
term, or who reads sentencing rules in order to discover how severely different 
sorts of crimes are punished, will be seriously misled.”); Barkow, Prosecutorial 
Administration, supra note 241, at 273–74 (“[W]e are living in a time of ‘prose-
cutorial administration,’ with prosecutors at the helm of every major federal 
criminal justice matter.”). 
 293. See Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration, supra note 241, at 272–73 
(“[P]rosecutors have often been a driving force in the political arena for man-
datory minimum sentences and new federal criminal laws.”); Daniel Richman, 
Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 749 (2003) (describing the mutual reliance between prosecutors and po-
lice). 
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ing for police,294 and in virtually all instances they have the 
ability to influence police conduct.295
Advancing police and prosecutors’ goals usually means advancing leg-
islators’ goals as well. Thus, legislators have good reason to listen 
when prosecutors urge some statutory change. This point is worth 
emphasizing, for it may be the single most important feature of the 
existing system for defining criminal law. Lawmaking and law en-
forcement are given to different institutions, in part to diffuse power, 
but the institutions are usually seeking the same ends. Since the in-
stitutions can also communicate—prosecutors can tell legislatures 
what legislation they need—the separation of crime definition and en-
forcement is less important, and less substantial, than one would 
think.
 As for their relationships 
with the legislative branch, Stuntz offers an analysis of the 
structural arrangements that give prosecutors so much inter-
branch influence: 
296
Stuntz’s proposition that “[l]egislators are better off when pros-
ecutors are better off,”
  
297
D. WHETHER LEVERAGE COULD BE APPLIED 
 and of the resultant influence that 
prosecutors have over legislators, supports the idea that ad-
justment of prosecutorial incentives could have effects beyond 
the prosecutorial branch. 
Even if applying leverage to the prosecutorial branch 
makes sense, one must still ask whether and how the legisla-
ture could be persuaded to apply the leverage by abandoning 
automatic exclusions. 
 
 294. See Ben David, Community-Based Prosecution in North Carolina: An 
Inside-Out Approach to Public Service at the Courthouse, on the Street, and in 
the Classroom, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 373, 385 (2012) (discussing district 
attorney participation in law enforcement training in the Fifth District of 
North Carolina); Marc L. Miller & Samantha Caplinger, Prosecution in Arizo-
na: Practical Problems, Prosecutorial Accountability, and Local Solutions, 41 
CRIME & JUST. 265, 297 (2012) (discussing training provided by the Pinal 
County Attorney's Office to all local police officers). 
 295. See Whitney Tymas, Director, Prosecution and Racial Justice, Vera 
Inst. of Justice, Address at the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law 
Fourth Annual Conference: New Frontiers in Race & Criminal Justice (Apr. 
17, 2012), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/adminofcriminallaw/ 
events/newfrontiers (“Prosecutors need to understand the real leadership they 
can exercise when it comes to not endorsing all police action. . . . It’s really OK 
to tell the police officer, ‘I’m not prosecuting this case.’ . . . Prosecutors can say 
no, and not just be case processers—really be leaders.”). 
 296. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 534–35. 
 297. Id. at 510 (adding that “judges cannot separate these natural allies”); 
see Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration, supra note 241, at 315 (“Politicians 
want to keep the powerful interests and the public happy, and that means giv-
ing the Department [of Justice] what it wants.”). 
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As stated above, those with criminal convictions hold little 
sway with the legislature.298 Yet this proposal does not lie at 
the “soft on crime” core of legislative anxiety.299 It is less likely 
to provoke legislative reluctance than the other ways in which 
the harms caused by these exclusions could be lessened: fewer 
felonies, for examples, or crimes, or prosecutions,300 or the ex-
punction of criminal convictions after a certain period of time.301 
In addition, the proposal dovetails with the goal of reentry, 
which is supported by federal and state legislation,302 and by 
economic imperatives.303
The surest indication that abandonment of automatic ex-
clusions is possible is that several states have done it. Both 
Colorado and Maine have abandoned their statutory disqualifi-
 
 
 298. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 299. See Gershowitz, supra note 278, at 47 (defending the viability of his 
proposal that prosecutors be regularly informed about jail and prison over-
crowding, on the ground that “because legislatures would simply be instruct-
ing that prosecutors be advised of the scale of imprisonment, and not specifi-
cally advocating lower sentences, there would be no danger of legislators 
appearing ‘soft on crime’”); id. at 80 (“[L]egislators are not averse to criminal 
justice reforms that will not carry the soft on crime label.”). 
 300. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 158, at 566 (“Over the 
course of the past century the number of criminal charges filed has increased 
very substantially . . . .”). 
 301. See Demleitner, supra note 119, at 162 (“To prevent such negative col-
lateral consequences for ex-offenders, a more comprehensive solution, adopted 
in some states, is needed: the expungement of criminal records after a certain 
period of time following the end of a sentence.”). 
 302. For federal legislation, see Second Chance Act of 2007: Community 
Safety Through Recidivism Prevention, Pub. L. No. 110-99, 122 Stat. 657, 658 
(2008) (listing among the stated purposes “to provide offenders in prisons, jails 
or juvenile facilities with educational, literacy, vocational, and job placement 
services to facilitate re-entry into the community,” and “to encourage the de-
velopment and support of, and to expand the availability of, evidence-based 
programs that enhance public safety and reduce recidivism, such as substance 
abuse treatment, alternatives to incarceration, and comprehensive reentry 
services”); Cole, supra note 133, at 32 (discussing passage of federal Second 
Chance Act). For state legislation, see, for example, the recent addition of a 
reentry and reintegration component to the purposes of New York’s Penal 
Law, which include “[i]nsur[ing] the public safety by preventing the commis-
sion of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, 
the rehabilitation of those convicted, the promotion of their successful and pro-
ductive reentry and reintegration into society, and their confinement when re-
quired in the interests of public protection.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 
2006) (emphasis added). 
 303. See JOHN ROMAN & AARON CHALFIN, URBAN INSTITUTE, DOES IT PAY 
TO INVEST IN REENTRY PROGRAMS FOR JAIL INMATES? JAIL REENTRY 
ROUNDTABLE INITIATIVE 19–23 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/ 
projects/reentry-roundtable/upload/roman_chalfin.pdf. 
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cation provisions.304 North Dakota, whose statutory disqualifi-
cation provision applies only to those who are in prison,305 has 
abandoned criminal convictions as an automatic basis for ex-
clusions for cause, and now requires that any court granting a 
challenge for cause find “[other] grounds.”306 Iowa has also re-
jected automatic exclusions, relying instead on challenges for 
cause that permit the judge to make an individualized deter-
mination about fitness.307
E. IF LEVERAGE FAILS  
 
Adopting this proposal may have only a modest effect, ei-
ther as regards leveraging investigation or reform, or as re-
gards permitting a broader segment of the community to serve 
on juries. Even a modest effect in this area would be worth-
while.308 In addition, whether or not it leverages investigation 
or reform, and whether or not it permits a broader segment of 
the community to serve, the abandonment of automatic exclu-
sions would bring benefits. First, with regard to the expressive 
power of the law, the message of automatic unfitness—and the 
tension that it creates with messages of reintegration—would 
be gone. Second, the requirement that an attorney should be 
able to challenge a juror for cause only if that juror has demon-
strated an individual bias would make it more likely that those 
present in the courtroom at the time of jury selection would 
hear an individual account of the experience of passing through 
the criminal justice system. The lawyers and the judge would 
ask and hear about what that experience was, and whether in-
deed it was embittering. Such an account is largely absent from 
the criminal courtroom;309 provided that ways can be found to 
protect the privacy of potential jurors,310
 
 304. See supra Part I.B. 
 its addition would be 
valuable. 
 305. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-33-01(1)(a), 27-09.1-08 (2013).  
 306. See supra note 59. 
 307. See supra note 58. 
 308. See Gershowitz, supra note 278, at 67 (“[W]hile additional information 
[about incarceration rates and prison crowding] will not foster drastic behav-
ioral changes, it is quite possible that it could change behavior at the margins . 
. . .”). 
 309. See Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 17, at 1452. 
 310. One method would be in camera questioning in the presence of only 
the parties and the judge, should the potential juror request it. 
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The current lack of investigation into the questions that 
these jurors would answer during voir dire is problematic.311 
Sharon Dolovich has written powerfully about the idea that our 
penal policies should be shaped by those acting as if behind a 
veil—unaware of whether they will end up with the keys or in 
the cell, but aware of the circumstances affecting everyone in-
volved.312 Under that view, both judges and attorneys—each of 
whom plays a part in shaping the criminal justice system—
should have a way of learning how things are in the cell. Mak-
ing social realities understood is a step toward their reform.313 
Even putting the veil to one side, there is good reason to listen 
to first-hand accounts. As noted above, procedural justice is 
concerned with how the person who passed through the crimi-
nal justice system views the procedures to which he or she was 
exposed.314
In the case of judges, Jack Weinstein has written of the 
risk that they become too remote from those whose lives they 
shape.
 Thus, those who oversee the system and its proce-
dures should heed the thoughts and views of those who have 
been subject to them. Particular facets of the role of both judge 




 311. See Roberts, Cost of Mass Incarceration, supra note 
 This risk of remoteness is magnified by the silencing 
130, at 1300 (argu-
ing that policymaking about incarceration has “yet to grasp the monumental 
devastation of prison growth on people’s lives”). 
 312. Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment, supra note 188, at 315–16. 
 313. See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (“[W]e sacrifice a great deal by discouraging the [de-
fendant’s ‘rotten social background’] defense. If we could remove the practical 
impediments to the free flow of information we might begin to learn something 
about the causes of crime. We might discover, for example, that there is a sig-
nificant causal relationship between violent criminal behavior and a ‘rotten 
social background.’ That realization would require us to consider, for example, 
whether income redistribution and social reconstruction are indispensable 
first steps toward solving the problem of violent crime.”); Gershowitz, supra 
note 278, at 67–72 (drawing on social psychology research on the influence of 
information on behavior in support of his proposal that prosecutors be educat-
ed about prison and jail overcrowding). 
 314. See supra Part III.D. 
 315. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for 
the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 
25–26 (2008) (“Judges often deal with people living ‘lives of silent desperation,’ 
who look to us for understanding. A judge’s experiences in and out of court—
aided by that of jurors—is critical to this vital rapport factor. . . . As judges, 
successful and with friends from affluent classes, we are too often out of touch 
emotionally with the people before us.”); id. at 26 (“[I]t is difficult to find the 
Roberts_MLR  
2013] CASUAL OSTRACISM 645 
 
of criminal defendants and the assumptions (and stereotypes) 
about criminal defendants and the criminal justice system that 
are likely to spring up to fill the silence;316 conversation could 
reduce remoteness, and replace assumptions and stereotypes 
with knowledge.317 Judges are vulnerable to implicit, or uncon-
scious, bias, which is liable to affect the decisions that they 
make about defendants;318 one possible antidote to the type of 
stereotyping encompassed within implicit bias is individuating 
information.319
In the case of prosecutors, the opportunity to learn indi-
viduating information about former criminal defendants would 





time or opportunity to recharge our batteries of compassion by meeting and 
helping people in our deprived communities.”). 
 In addition, learning about the experiences of those ex-
posed to a criminal justice system in which prosecutors play 
such a powerful role seems central to a prosecutor’s duties. 
Prosecutors have a duty to see that procedural justice is pro-
 316. See Rubio v. Super. Ct., 593 P.2d 595, 606 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) 
(Tobriner, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for making unsupported as-
sumptions about those with felony convictions); id. at 611–12 (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (same). 
 317. See Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 17, at 1500–01 (“[D]efendant si-
lence means that there is little empathetic or education impetus for change in 
the perceptions and predispositions of these institutional decisionmakers. . . . 
[This] silence is a recipe for continued institutional hostility.”). 
 318. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Iqbal & Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 
1008 (2010). 
 319. See Dolovich, Exclusion and Control, supra note 131, at 266–67 (argu-
ing that “a political strategy emphasizing the financial costs of incarceration is 
bound to fail unless it also generates an ideological reorientation towards rec-
ognizing the people the state incarcerates as fellow human beings and fellow 
citizens, entitled to respect and consideration as such”); Gregory Mitchell & 
Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1114 (2006) (“[S]tereotype effects recede as people learn 
more about each other as individuals, with individuating information often 
overwhelming stereotype information.”); Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 17, 
at 1503 (mentioning the challenge “to reconceptualize defendants as speakers 
rather than objects of litigation, to turn them from abstract ‘juridical sub-
ject[s]’ into thinking, feeling human beings from whom, as a society, we need 
to hear”). 
 320. See ALEXANDER, supra note 75, at 115 (“Numerous studies have 
shown that prosecutors interpret and respond to identical criminal activity 
differently based on the race of the offender.”); Justin D. Levinson, Race, 
Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 617 (2009) (citing 
research indicating that implicit bias among prosecutors may lead to racial 
disparities in capital cases, and that unconscious bias may affect prosecutors 
even more than others). 
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vided to every defendant;321 and, more broadly, to see that jus-
tice is served;322 to reform the system;323 and to represent “the 
People.” It is hard to imagine how they can meet any of those 
duties without hearing from that portion of the people that has 
been convicted, particularly without hearing how they view the 
criminal justice system and their experience within it.324 The 
inability of this group to be heard by prosecutors is a striking 
facet of the lack of prosecutorial accountability.325
In the case of both judges and prosecutors, the failure to 
receive feedback from those who experience the convictions and 
punishments that they help bring about hinders the prospects 
of reform. Natapoff has described the fact that judges and pros-
ecutors “almost never” hear from defendants as a “process fail-
ure,”
 
326 and a “systemic dysfunction that impedes progress 
within the criminal system.”327
 
 321. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013). 
 Her detailed recitation of the 
harms to judges and prosecutors, and to society more generally, 
caused by the silencing of defendants during the progression of 
 322. For rules emphasizing that the prosecution’s duty is to do justice, ra-
ther than obtain convictions, see id.; AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 4 (Standard 
3-1.2) (3d ed. 1992); id. at 9; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 
(1980).  
 323. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 322, at 4 (Standard 3-1.2(d)) (stating 
prosecutors’ duty to “seek to reform and improve the administration of crimi-
nal justice”); id. (stating that a prosecutor is duty-bound to try to correct sub-
stantive and procedural inadequacies and injustices). 
 324. See Howard, supra note 86, at 418 (prosecutors should “embrace the 
diversity of opinion that a community cross-section brings to a venire, and, ul-
timately, the jury”). 
 325. See supra note 271. 
 326. Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 17, at 1452 (“Since defendants speak 
for themselves so infrequently, judges, prosecutors, and lawmakers almost 
never hear from them, and the democratic processes that generate our justice 
system proceed without those voices. This process failure reinforces the social 
and psychological gaps between defendants and those who adjudicate them.”); 
id. at 1457 (mentioning “the institutional loss of information about defendant 
perceptions and experiences that might enable the judicial and political 
spheres to respond better to those who populate the criminal justice system”); 
id. at 1487 (“Criminal defendants are excluded from the ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
that shapes the criminal justice system. Spoken for and about by lawyers, 
criminologists, legislators, and law enforcement, defendants rarely share their 
own views on the criminal process: Is it fair? Does it deter? Does it seem cruel 
or lenient? Legitimate or overbearing? Rational or random? At no point during 
the criminal process can defendants safely share their thoughts on these mat-
ters, and afterwards, in prison or on release, the opportunities to speak are 
even more scarce.”). 
 327. Id. at 1503. 
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their cases—all the lost opportunities for learning and reform—
applies with full force to the failure of judges and prosecutors to 
hear from those who are kept from jury service by their convic-
tions.328 As things stand, “[i]f the system was intended to keep 
society substantially clueless about the people it incarcerates, it 
could not have been better designed.”329 In addition, regardless 
of anything that potential jurors may say about their experi-
ence in the criminal justice system, merely by being present in 
the jury box, these jurors will speak through their numerosity 
about the breadth of criminalization, sending a message that 
may be silenced by automatic exclusions, and that may prompt 
reform, or at least reflection.330
  CONCLUSION   
 
Automatic jury exclusions of those with criminal records 
should be abandoned. They are not needed to ensure fairness; 
the challenge for cause exists for cases of demonstrated bias. 
Indeed, they increase unfairness, by enhancing racial dispari-
ties, impeding reentry, and insisting that only those who lack a 
particular type of knowledge of the criminal justice system can 
scrutinize it. Limiting cost-free jury removals to those instances 
where bias can be shown would require attorneys and judges to 
hear and address what potential jurors say about their criminal 
justice experience. Imposing a litigation cost for all other re-
movals would require prosecutors to internalize the cost of the 
embitterment that they assume. Let the cost of a criminal jus-
tice system so embittering as to preclude its fair consideration 
be borne by those who create and perpetuate it. 
 
 328. See id. at 1498–1501. For example, the system would “obtain more in-
formation about law enforcement and how police behave, in ways that sup-
pression hearings rarely permit because defendants face incrimination if they 
take the stand. Every aspect of criminal justice . . . could be evaluated in light 
of its actual effects on its intended targets.” Id. at 1499; see also id. at 1501–02 
(“Defendant silence . . . reinforces legal norms of punitiveness, hostility, and 
incomprehension. . . . Because it eliminates the primary voices that might be 
raised against harsh practices including long sentences, inhumane prison con-
ditions, and deprivations of rights upon conviction, defendant silence helps to 
validate such practices.”). 
 329. Id. at 1499. Besides not hearing about individual experiences, judges 
and prosecutors never hear the “full story” about “the functioning of the justice 
system itself.” Id.  
 330. Compare this proposal to Gershowitz’s suggestion that prosecutors be 
told of prison and jail crowding, in the hope, backed by social psychology re-
search, that these figures have some effect on prosecutorial behavior. 
Gershowitz, supra note 278, at 67. 
